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作者:Pawliczek, Andrea; Skinner, A. Nicole; Zechman, Sarah L. C.
作者单位:University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要:We examine whether voluntary disclosure is associated with incentives for firms to collude. Public disclosure can facilitate collusion by aiding with coordination and monitoring for defections. Using common ownership (investors holding stock in competing firms) to identify reduced incentives to compete, we find a positive association between public disclosure and these incentives. We also find that common ownership is positively associated with measures of disclosure that are likely to facilit...
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作者:Guggenmos, Ryan D.; Rennekamp, Kristina; Rupar, Kathy; Wang, Sean
作者单位:Cornell University; University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Southern Methodist University
摘要:This study uses a controlled experiment to examine the trade-off between managers' use of non-GAAP and GAAP earnings to satisfy market expectations and how this relationship can be moderated by both formal and informal regulatory attention to non-GAAP earnings. Our key takeaway is that allowing financial reporting discretion in an alternative disclosure channel, that is, non-GAAP earnings, can reduce firms' opportunistic GAAP reporting. However, statements by regulators about increased attenti...
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作者:Choudhary, Preeti; Merkley, Kenneth; Schipper, Katherine
作者单位:University of Arizona; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Duke University
摘要:We analyze the disposition of auditor-proposed adjustments to financial statements. Our analyses address concerns, expressed by regulators and others, that auditors and their clients fixate on quantitative thresholds and overlook qualitative factors in assessing the materiality of discovered misstatements. Using a large sample of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)-inspected audits, we examine the frequency with which management records versus waives auditor-proposed adjustments ...
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作者:Brown, Nerissa C.; Gale, Brian T.; Grant, Stephanie M.
作者单位:University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要:Recent regulatory amendments aimed at modernizing disclosures and enhancing their usefulness focus on repetition and interactivity within firms' disclosure filings. We use two experiments to provide evidence on the effects of disclosure repetition (repeating of information in the filing) and disclosure interactivity (user involvement in directing the form or content of the information displayed) on investors' information processing and investment judgments. Results show that repetition increas...
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作者:Feichter, Christoph; Moers, Frank; Timmermans, Oscar
作者单位:Vienna University of Economics & Business; Maastricht University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要:We examine the relation between incentive plans based on relative performance and competitive aggressiveness. Using data on executive incentive-compensation contracts in large U.S. firms, we find a positive association between competitive aggressiveness and peer group overlap-that is, the extent to which two firms select each other as peers in these incentive plans. Our findings indicate that managers of such firms take more frequent as well as more complex competitive actions, relative to man...
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作者:Lu, Jinzhi
作者单位:City University of Hong Kong
摘要:I develop a theory to study the consequences of providing more detailed information to rationally inattentive investors. I first consider a simple data-provision problem and show that adding more data or detail in financial statements can make it more difficult for investors to extract information. Consequently, investors who have limited information-processing capacity may prefer less detailed information. I also show that when investors' decisions are complements, providing details in additi...
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作者:Bochkay, Khrystyna; Markov, Stan; Subasi, Musa; Weisbrod, Eric
作者单位:University of Miami; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Kansas
摘要:In September 2009, Thomson Reuters (TR) discontinued its practice of relying on analysts to determine the treatment of unexpected charges and gains in favor of their immediate exclusion from GAAP earnings. Adopting a difference-in-differences approach, we show that this plausibly exogenous change in TR's methodology resulted in street earnings that are more predictive of future performance; and timelier, more accurate, and less dispersed analyst forecasts of future earnings, consistent with TR...
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作者:Hallman, Nicholas J.; Schmidt, Jaime J.; Thompson, Anne M.
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要:We investigate whether non-GAAP reporting affects the audit process and thereby the quality of the related financial statements. First, we provide evidence that auditors in numerous countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom, rely to varying degrees on non-GAAP profit before tax as a benchmark for determining quantitative materiality. Then, using Premium Listed companies on the London Stock Exchange, we document that U.K. auditor reliance on non-GAAP materiality benchmarks o...
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作者:Bordeman, Adam; Demerjian, Peter
作者单位:California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要:In this study, we replicate and extend the Dichev and Skinner [DS: 2002] study on the debt covenant hypothesis (DCH). We start by replicating DS and find results consistent with theirs. We then extend their work by changing three aspects of the research design: histogram bin width, calculation of slack, and statistical test of discontinuity. We find that the inference from DS is generally robust to varying these choices, although sensitive to different bin widths, during their sample period. W...