Facilitating Tacit Collusion Through Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Common Ownership

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pawliczek, Andrea; Skinner, A. Nicole; Zechman, Sarah L. C.
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12452
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1651-1693
• 关键词: TEXTUAL ANALYSIS; INFORMATION; COMMUNICATION; COMPETITION; FIRMS; liquidity; pressure; QUALITY; cost

摘要

We examine whether voluntary disclosure is associated with incentives for firms to collude. Public disclosure can facilitate collusion by aiding with coordination and monitoring for defections. Using common ownership (investors holding stock in competing firms) to identify reduced incentives to compete, we find a positive association between public disclosure and these incentives. We also find that common ownership is positively associated with measures of disclosure that are likely to facilitate tacit collusion and that this association is stronger in industries where collusion is easier. Our study expands the literature on disclosure and competition among firms by showing that public disclosure is positively associated with incentives for tacit collusion. This finding is consistent with managers facilitating anticompetitive outcomes using voluntary disclosure.