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作者：Zureich, Jacob
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：The controllability principle suggests that employees should not be held accountable for factors outside their control. This study develops novel theory to challenge that thinking. According to the theory, holding employees accountable for uncontrollable factors like peer performance can lead to improved decision-making by increasing how much employees learn from those uncontrollable factors. I expect this effect to occur because goal-focused employees only consider information that seems goal...
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作者：Tomar, Sorabh
作者单位：Southern Methodist University
摘要：I examine the effects of the U.S. Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Reporting Program, which requires thousands of industrial facilities to measure and report their GHG emissions. I show that facilities reduce their GHG emissions by 7.9% following the disclosure of emissions data. The evidence indicates that benchmarking-whereby facilities use the disclosures of their peers to assess their own relative GHG performance-spurs emission reductions. Firms' concerns about future legislation appear to motivate th...
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作者：Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. E.
作者单位：Universitetet i Stavanger; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：Reward systems based on balanced scorecards often connect pay to an index, that is, a weighted sum of multiple performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are nonverifiable so that the contracting parties must rely on self-enforcement. Under commonly invoked assumptions (including normally distributed measurements), we show that the weights in the index reflect a tradeoff between distortion and precision for the measures. The efficien...
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作者：Chan, Eric W. W.; Lill, Jeremy B. B.; Maas, Victor S. S.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Kansas; University of Amsterdam
摘要：Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an interactive experiment, we examine the drivers of managers' promote/hire decisions and internal employees' behavior before and after those decisions. Consistent with gift exchange theory, we find that employees exert costly effort to increase the chance of being promoted, and they raise their effort level as the promote/hire decision becomes imminent. Managers respond by promoting t...
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作者：Chen, Wei; Hribar, Paul; Melessa, Sam
作者单位：University of Connecticut; University of Iowa; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：We analyze the standard error bias associated with the use of generated regressors-independent variables generated from first-step regressions-in accounting research settings. Under general conditions, generated regressors do not affect the consistency of coefficient estimates. However, commonly used generated regressors can cause standard errors to be understated. Problematic generated regressors include predicted values, coefficient estimates, and measures derived from these estimates. Widel...
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作者：Dehaan, Ed; Li, Nan; Zhou, Frank S.
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Toronto; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We investigate the effects of financial reporting on current employee job search, that is, whether firms' public financial reports cause their employees to reevaluate their jobs and consider leaving. We develop theory for why current employees use earnings announcements (EAs) to inform job search decisions, and empirically investigate job search based on employees' activity on a popular job market website. We find that job search by current employees increases significantly during EA weeks, es...
