The (Un)Controllability Principle: The Benefits of Holding Employees Accountable for Uncontrollable Factors

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zureich, Jacob
• 署名单位: Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12467
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 653-690
• 关键词: controllability principle; PERFORMANCE-MEASUREMENT; moral hazard; COMPENSATION; INFORMATION; incentives; feedback; expectancy; experience; BEHAVIOR

摘要

The controllability principle suggests that employees should not be held accountable for factors outside their control. This study develops novel theory to challenge that thinking. According to the theory, holding employees accountable for uncontrollable factors like peer performance can lead to improved decision-making by increasing how much employees learn from those uncontrollable factors. I expect this effect to occur because goal-focused employees only consider information that seems goal-relevant, and uncontrollable factors only seem goal relevant when employees are held accountable for them. Results from a decision-making experiment support the theory. In particular, paying participants based on uncontrollable factors improves their decision-making despite providing them with weaker economic incentives. This positive effect is more pronounced when the uncontrollable factors are more informative and when individuals are more goal-focused. These findings reveal a previously unexplored benefit of disregarding the controllability principle that can help explain why broad, uncontrollable metrics are so prevalent and successful in practice.