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作者:Carter, ME; Lynch, LJ
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; University of Virginia
摘要:We examine whether repricing underwater stock options reduces executive and overall employee turnover using a sample of firms that reprice stock options in 1998 and a sample of firms with underwater stock options that choose not to reprice. We find little evidence that repricing affects executive turnover. However, using forfeited stock options to proxy for overall employee turnover, we find that 1999 employee turnover is negatively related to the 1998 repricing, suggesting that repricing help...
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作者:Palmrose, ZV; Richardson, VJ; Scholz, S
作者单位:University of Kansas; University of Southern California
摘要:We examine the market reaction to a sample of 403 restatements announced from 1995 to 1999. We document an average abnormal return of about -9 percent over a 2-day announcement window. We find that more negative returns are associated with restatements involving fraud, affecting more accounts, decreasing reported income and attributed to auditors or management (but not the Securities and Exchange Commission). There appears to be an additional penalty for announcements that do not quantify the ...
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作者:Pittman, JA; Fortin, S
作者单位:Memorial University Newfoundland; McGill University
摘要:We examine the impact of auditor choice on debt pricing in firms' early public years when they are lesser known. Our evidence suggests that retaining a Big Six auditor, which can reduce debt-monitoring costs by enhancing the credibility of financial statements, enables young firms to lower their borrowing costs. Extant research implies that information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders is decreasing in firm age. We also provide evidence consistent with our predictions that choosing a Big...
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作者:Fee, CE; Hadlock, CJ
作者单位:Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business
摘要:We study management turnover for the top five executives in a sample of 443 large firms from 1993 through 1998. The rate of forced turnover for non-CEOs is at least as great as that for CEOs, but the sensitivity of turnover to firm performance is smaller for non-CEOs. The probability that a non-CEO leaves office is elevated around CEO dismissals, particularly when the replacement CEO is an outsider. Many dismissed executives obtain new employment, but on average their new positions are signifi...
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作者:Weber, JP
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:This paper examines the shareholders' perceptions of the costs and benefits associated with the use of pooling-of-interests. The paper focuses on the market's reaction to the SEC's adoption of SAB 96. This regulation-forced firms to chose between using pooling-of-interests and maintaining their share repurchase programs. Overall, the results suggest shareholders perceive there to be a net cost when managers choose to use pooling-of-interests. These findings should be of particular interest to ...