Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy

成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Fee, CE; Hadlock, CJ
署名单位:
Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business
刊物名称:
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN:
0165-4101
DOI:
10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.11.003
发表日期:
2004
关键词:
firm performance ceo turnover career concerns incentives COMPENSATION COMPETITION DIRECTORSHIPS replacement MARKET IMPACT
摘要:
We study management turnover for the top five executives in a sample of 443 large firms from 1993 through 1998. The rate of forced turnover for non-CEOs is at least as great as that for CEOs, but the sensitivity of turnover to firm performance is smaller for non-CEOs. The probability that a non-CEO leaves office is elevated around CEO dismissals, particularly when the replacement CEO is an outsider. Many dismissed executives obtain new employment, but on average their new positions are significantly inferior to their prior jobs. Labor market outcomes are related to past compensation and the circumstances around departure. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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