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作者:Gaver, JJ; Paterson, JS
作者单位:University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要:We report that insurance firms manage loss reserves to avoid violating certain test ratio bounds (known as IRIS ratios) that are used by regulators for solvency assessment. In our sample, almost two-thirds of the firms that would violate four or more IRIS ratios successfully adjust reserves to reduce the reported number of violations to less than four. This finding is significant because four violations usually trigger regulatory intervention. Our results indicate that non-earnings goals are a...
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作者:Black, EL; Carnes, TA; Mosebach, M; Moyer, SE
作者单位:University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; Brigham Young University; University of North Carolina; Western Carolina University
摘要:Both debt covenants and federal monitoring restrict banks' discretion. We examine whether banks substituted monitoring for covenants by investigating debt issues of 105 banks between 1979 and 1984, a period when monitoring increased. We hypothesize that bank shareholders take advantage of the intersection between debt covenants and regulatory monitoring to reduce agency costs. We find a decrease in the number of debt issues containing such covenants and the total debt subject to such covenants...
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作者:Brown, S; Hillegeist, SA; Lo, K
作者单位:Northwestern University; Emory University; University of British Columbia
摘要:We hypothesize that conference calls are voluntary disclosures that lead to long-term reductions in information asymmetry among equity investors. Cross-sectional and time-series tests show that information asymmetry is negatively associated with conference call activity. Firms initiating a policy of regularly holding conference calls experience statistically and economically significant and sustained reductions in information asymmetry, in contrast to one-time callers, who experience no signif...
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作者:Gintschel, A; Markov, S
作者单位:Emory University
摘要:We examine whether Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) has reduced the informativeness of analysts' information outputs. For a sample of financial analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations released in a 2-year window around Reg FD's effective date, we show that in the post-Regulation FD period the absolute price impact of information disseminated by financial analysts is lower by 28%. We also show that the drop in price impact varies systematically with brokerage house and stock charact...
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作者:Anderson, RC; Mansi, SA; Reeb, DM
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; American University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要:Creditor reliance on accounting-based debt covenants suggests that debtors are potentially concerned with board of director characteristics that influence the integrity of financial accounting reports. In a sample of S&P 500 firms, we find that the cost of debt is inversely related to board independence and board size. We also find that fully independent audit committees are associated with a significantly lower cost of debt financing. Similarly, yield spreads are also negatively related to au...