Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, RC; Mansi, SA; Reeb, DM
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; American University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.01.004
• 发表日期: 2004
• 关键词: AUDIT COMMITTEE; OWNERSHIP; covenants; firm; DIRECTORS; POISON

摘要

Creditor reliance on accounting-based debt covenants suggests that debtors are potentially concerned with board of director characteristics that influence the integrity of financial accounting reports. In a sample of S&P 500 firms, we find that the cost of debt is inversely related to board independence and board size. We also find that fully independent audit committees are associated with a significantly lower cost of debt financing. Similarly, yield spreads are also negatively related to audit committee size and meeting frequency. Overall, these results provide market-based evidence that boards and audit committees are important elements affecting the reliability of financial reports. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.