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作者：Balakrishnan, Karthik; Bartov, Eli; Faurel, Lucile
作者单位：New York University; University of Pennsylvania; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We document a market failure to fully respond to loss/profit quarterly announcements. The annualized post portfolio formation return spread between two portfolios formed on extreme losses and extreme profits is approximately 21 percent. This loss/profit anomaly is incremental to previously documented accounting-related anomalies, and is robust to alternative risk adjustments, distress risk, firm size, short sales constraints, transaction costs, and sample periods. In an effort to explain this ...
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作者：Cohen, Daniel A.; Zarowin, Paul
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We show that SEO firms engage in real activities manipulation, and the decline in post-SEO performance due to the real activities management is more severe than that due to accrual management. Our evidence is important, because it shows that post-SEO operating underperformance is driven not just by accrual reversals, but also reflects the real consequences of operational decisions made to manage earnings. We also show how firms' choices of real versus accrual-based earnings management activiti...
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作者：Larcker, David F.; Rusticus, Tjomme O.
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要：Instrumental variable (IV) methods are commonly used in accounting research (e.g., earnings management, corporate governance, executive compensation, and disclosure research) when the regressor variables are endogenous. While IV estimation is the standard textbook solution to mitigating endogeneity problems, the appropriateness of IV methods in typical accounting research settings is not obvious. Drawing on recent advances in statistics and econometrics, we identify conditions under which IV m...
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作者：Dechow, Patricia M.; Myers, Linda A.; Shakespeare, Catherine
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Accounting rules for valuing retained interest from securitizations require management to make assumptions concerning discount Fates, default rates, and prepayment rates. These assumptions provide management with discretion to determine the gain on sale of the receivables. We investigate whether CEO compensation is less sensitive to Securitization gains than to other earnings components in the presence of proxies for how independent (Outsiders, females, fewer CEO-selected directors) and inform...
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作者：Engel, Ellen; Hayes, Rachel M.; Wang, Xue
作者单位：University of Chicago; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Emory University
摘要：We examine the relation between audit committee compensation and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process, We find that total compensation and cash retainers paid to audit committees are positively Correlated with audit fees and the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Our Proxies for the demand for monitoring. Our results are robust to the inclusion of audit committee quality, measured as the committee chair financial expertise. Our results suggest a recent willingness by fir...
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作者：Aboody, David; Johnson, Nicole Bastian; Kasznik, Ron
作者单位：Stanford University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We investigate firms' operating performance subsequent to the repricing of executive and non-executive employee stock options. We find that, relative to non-repricers, repricing firms have a larger increase in operating income and cash flows in subsequent periods. This performance improvement is attributable to the underlying economic determinants of the decision to restore the options' incentive properties. However, only repricings of executive stock options are associated with improvement in...
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作者：Heitzman, Shane; Wasley, Charles; Zimmerman, Jerold
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：Under GAAP, SEC and exchange listing rules, managers Must disclose material information. We construct a disclosure specification incorporating managers' obligation to disclose material information and voluntary disclosure incentives. We demonstrate that tests of the incentives to voluntarily disclose information Must recognize such information is often disclosed because Of all Underlying duty to disclose. Our empirical tests isolating the impact of materiality on firms' disclosures have greate...
