Audit committee compensation and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engel, Ellen; Hayes, Rachel M.; Wang, Xue
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Emory University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.08.001
• 发表日期: 2010
• 关键词: Director compensation; services; firm; INDEPENDENCE; CONSEQUENCES; RESTATEMENTS; remuneration; boards; fees

摘要

We examine the relation between audit committee compensation and the demand for monitoring of the financial reporting process, We find that total compensation and cash retainers paid to audit committees are positively Correlated with audit fees and the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Our Proxies for the demand for monitoring. Our results are robust to the inclusion of audit committee quality, measured as the committee chair financial expertise. Our results suggest a recent willingness by firms to deviate from the historically prevalent one-size-fits-all approach to director pay in response to increased demands on audit committees and differential director expertise. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.