The joint effects of materiality thresholds and voluntary disclosure incentives on firms' disclosure decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Heitzman, Shane; Wasley, Charles; Zimmerman, Jerold
• 署名单位: University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.10.002
• 发表日期: 2010
• 关键词: MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS; cross-sectional determinants; sfas no. 131; discretionary disclosure; CORPORATE DISCLOSURE; information asymmetry; institutional investors; response coefficients; Partial observability; Market equilibrium

摘要

Under GAAP, SEC and exchange listing rules, managers Must disclose material information. We construct a disclosure specification incorporating managers' obligation to disclose material information and voluntary disclosure incentives. We demonstrate that tests of the incentives to voluntarily disclose information Must recognize such information is often disclosed because Of all Underlying duty to disclose. Our empirical tests isolating the impact of materiality on firms' disclosures have greater explanatory power over empirical tests that do not. Voluntary disclosure incentives better explain disclosure when the information is less likely to be material. Tests Of voluntary disclosure theories ignoring materiality likely lead to incorrect inferences. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.