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作者:Kim, Kyonghee; Mauldin, Elaine; Patro, Sukesh
作者单位:University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; Northern Illinois University
摘要:Divergent views exist about whether boards must tradeoff advising for monitoring performance when utilizing outside versus inside directors. We suggest a dichotomous tradeoff focus underestimates outside directors' impact on board performance. We find outside director tenure positively associated with firm acquisition/investment policy advising performance and CEO compensation monitoring performance, suggesting that advising and monitoring do not always compete for directors' time. However, te...
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作者:Li, Feng; Minnis, Michael; Nagar, Venky; Rajan, Madhav
作者单位:University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Chicago; Stanford University
摘要:Knowledge is central to managing an organization, but its presence in employees is difficult to measure directly. We hypothesize that external communication patterns reveal the location of knowledge within the management team. Using a large database of firm conference call transcripts, we find that CEOs speak less in settings where they are likely to be relatively less knowledgeable. CEOs who speak more are also paid more, and firms whose CEO pay is not commensurate with CEO speaking have a lo...
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作者:Fox, William F.; Luna, LeAnn; Schaur, Georg
作者单位:University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
摘要:Tax evasion has been an important issue in the accounting literature for several decades. but the focus has been on corporate income taxes. We develop a new way to examine tax evasion that focuses on corporate transactions, rather than corporate profits. Specifically, we examine how commodity flows respond to destination sales taxes, allowing for tax evasion as a function of distance between trade partners. After accounting for transportation costs, we find that the effect of taxes decreases a...
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作者:Li, Xi
作者单位:Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要:I examine the short- and long-term impact of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on cross-listed foreign private issuers. Both short- and long-term test results suggest that the costs of SOX compliance significantly exceed its benefits and reduce the net benefits of cross-listings. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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作者:Sikes, Stephanie A.; Tian, Xiaoli (Shaolee); Wilson, Ryan
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Oregon
摘要:The recent economic downturn resulted in firms generating significant tax losses, which they risked losing if they experienced an ownership change. In response, a number of loss firms adopted poison pill plans. We document a significant negative market reaction to the announcement of 62 poison pill adoptions related to net operating losses (NOLs), suggesting that in general investors do not consider management's claim that the pills are adopted to preserve a valuable tax asset to be credible. ...
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作者:DeFond, Mark; Zhang, Jieying
作者单位:University of Southern California; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要:We define higher audit quality as greater assurance of high financial reporting quality. Researchers use many proxies for audit quality, with little guidance on choosing among them. We provide a framework for systematically evaluating their unique strengths and weaknesses. Because it is inextricably intertwined with financial reporting quality, audit quality also depends on firms' innate characteristics and financial reporting systems. Our review of the models commonly used to disentangle thes...
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作者:Friedman, Henry L.
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要:Building on archival, anecdotal, and survey evidence on managers roles in accounting manipulations, I develop an agency model to examine the effects of a CEO's power to pressure a CFO to bias a performance measure, like earnings. This power has implications for incentive compensation, reporting quality, firm value, and information rents. Predictions from the model provide potential explanations for the differing results from recent empirical studies on the impact of regulatory interventions li...
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作者:Beatty, Anne; Liao, Scott
作者单位:University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Toronto
摘要:We survey research on banks' financial accounting. After providing a brief background of the theoretical models and accounting and regulatory institutions underlying the bank accounting literature, we review three streams of empirical research. Specifically we review studies associating bank financial reporting with the valuation and risk assessments, associating bank financial reporting discretion with regulatory capital and earnings management, and examining banks' economic decisions under d...
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作者:Collins, Daniel W.; Hribar, Paul; Tian, Xiaoli (Shaolee)
作者单位:University of Iowa; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要:Earnings asymmetric timeliness captures both accrual and operating cash flow (CFO) asymmetric timeliness. Because recognition of operating cash flows does not reflect differential verification thresholds for recognizing unrealized gains versus losses, CFO asymmetry adds noise or bias to tests of conditional conservatism. We show that CFO asymmetry is predictable in the cross-section, and varies systematically with life-cycle characteristics. Removing CFO from earnings and using accruals-based ...
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作者:Correia, Maria M.
作者单位:University of London; London Business School
摘要:In this study, I examine whether firms and executives with long-term political connections through contributions and lobbying incur lower costs from the enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). I find that politically connected firms on average are less likely to be involved in SEC enforcement actions and face lower penalties if they are prosecuted by the SEC. Contributions to politicians in a strong position to put pressure on the SEC are more effective than others...