Knowledge, compensation, and firm value: An empirical analysis of firm communication

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Feng; Minnis, Michael; Nagar, Venky; Rajan, Madhav
• 署名单位: University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Chicago; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.06.003
• 发表日期: 2014
• 关键词: CONFERENCE CALLS; voluntary disclosure; ceo compensation; market valuation; overconfidence; authority; Managers

摘要

Knowledge is central to managing an organization, but its presence in employees is difficult to measure directly. We hypothesize that external communication patterns reveal the location of knowledge within the management team. Using a large database of firm conference call transcripts, we find that CEOs speak less in settings where they are likely to be relatively less knowledgeable. CEOs who speak more are also paid more, and firms whose CEO pay is not commensurate with CEO speaking have a lower industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. Communication thus appears to reveal knowledge. (C) 2014 Elsevier By. All rights reserved.