A review of archival auditing research

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: DeFond, Mark; Zhang, Jieying
• 署名单位: University of Southern California; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.002
• 发表日期: 2014
• 关键词: SARBANES-OXLEY-ACT; going-concern opinions; internal control weaknesses; firm industry specialization; officer equity incentives; value financial expertise; client bargaining power; legal liability regimes; nonaudit service fees; corporate governance

摘要

We define higher audit quality as greater assurance of high financial reporting quality. Researchers use many proxies for audit quality, with little guidance on choosing among them. We provide a framework for systematically evaluating their unique strengths and weaknesses. Because it is inextricably intertwined with financial reporting quality, audit quality also depends on firms' innate characteristics and financial reporting systems. Our review of the models commonly used to disentangle these constructs suggests the need for better conceptual guidance. Finally, we urge more research on the role of auditor and client competency in driving audit quality. (C) 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).