Discretionary disclosures using a certifier

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Marinovic, Ivan; Sridhar, Sri S.
• 署名单位: Stanford University; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.11.003
• 发表日期: 2015
• 关键词: information; QUALITY; MARKET

摘要

This paper studies two disclosure regimes when a firm with superior private information must rely on a strategic certifier to disclose credibly its prospects. In the ex ante (ex post) disclosure regime, the firm must decide on whether to hire the certifier before (after) observing the certifier's noisy assessment. Endogenously determined certification fees can actually cause the disclosure probability to decrease in disclosure precision. In the ex ante regime, favorable disclosures are more informative than unfavorable disclosures because of additional positive signaling effect. In the ex post (ex ante) regime, the certifier has incentives to increase (decrease) the disclosure precision. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.