CEO turnover in large banks: Does tail risk matter?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Srivastav, Abhishek; Keasey, Kevin; Mollah, Sabur; Vallascas, Francesco
• 署名单位: University of Leeds; University of Hull
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.05.001
• 发表日期: 2017
• 关键词: relative performance evaluation; MARKET DISCIPLINE; moral hazard; Deposit insurance; Financial institutions; corporate governance; earnings management; information-content; Ownership structure; executive turnover

摘要

In a cross-country setting we show the probability of a forced CEO turnover in large banks is positively associated with idiosyncratic tail risk. This finding is strengthened the greater the competition in the banking industry and when stakeholders have more to lose in the case of distress. Overall, the exposure to idiosyncratic tail risk offers valuable signals to bank boards on the quality of the choices made by CEOs. In contrast, systematic tail risk becomes important for forced CEO turnovers only in the presence of a major variation in the costs this risk generates for shareholders and the organization. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.