-
作者:Kerr, Jon N.
摘要:Despite evidence that tax surprise is incrementally value relevant, the literature has done little to broaden the investigation beyond the United States or examine circumstances that affect informativeness. After extending to the international setting, I examine the impact of tax enforcement. I report strong results of greater value relevance when tax enforcement is high and that the value relevance of tax surprise is mostly contained within its interaction with tax enforcement. These findings...
-
作者:Brown, Lawrence D.; Call, Andrew C.; Clement, Michael B.; Sharp, Nathan Y.
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要:Investor relations officers (IROs) play a central role in corporate communications with Wall Street. We survey 610 IROs at U.S. public companies and conduct 14 follow-up interviews to deepen our understanding of the role of IROs in corporate disclosure events. Three important themes emerge from our results: (i) the value, nature, and timing of private communication between IROs, analysts, and investors; (ii) the significant influence IROs have on corporate disclosures; and (iii) the degree of ...
-
作者:Tan, Hun-Tong; Wang, Elaine Ying; Yoo, G-Song
作者单位:Nanyang Technological University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; University of Sydney
摘要:We experimentally investigate how jargon affects investment willingness for investors with different industry knowledge, and whether such effects vary with good or bad jargon. We find that for investors without industry knowledge, jargon decreases investment willingness because it decreases understanding. However, for investors with some but low industry knowledge, jargon increases investment willingness because it increases perceived product premium. Such effects exist whether good or bad jar...
-
作者:Wheeler, P. Barrett
作者单位:Tulane University
摘要:I provide evidence that loan loss accounting affects procyclical lending through its impact on regulatory actions. Regulators are more likely to place banks with inadequate loan loss allowances under enforcement actions that restrict lending, leading these banks to lend less during downturns. Further, I find that banks with lower regulatory ratings lend less when they have more timely provisions, consistent with research theorizing that timely provisions increase transparency and inhibit regul...
-
作者:Lin, Chen; Officer, Micah S.; Schmid, Thomas; Zou, Hong
作者单位:University of Hong Kong; Loyola Marymount University
摘要:This paper examines the incentive effects of a mandatory personal deductible in liability insurance contracts for directors and officers (D&Os). Exploiting a novel German law that mandates personal deductibles for executives, we document positive returns for affected firms around the first announcement of the plan to impose a personal deductible. We also find evidence of long-run effects: affected firms decrease risk taking in operational activities and financial reporting, and improve the qua...
-
作者:Tomy, Rimmy E.
作者单位:University of Chicago
摘要:This paper studies managers' use of accounting discretion to deter entry. Using state-level changes in branching regulation under the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, I find geographically-constrained community banks increased their loan loss provisions to appear less profitable when faced with the threat of entry by competitors. Additional tests rule out alternative explanations that firm economics or regulators drove the increase. I complement my analyses with survey-based ev...
-
作者:Altinkilic, Oya; Balashov, Vadim S.; Hansen, Robert S.
作者单位:University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Camden; Tulane University
摘要:We assess investment banks' influence over the agreement between their analysts' research behavior and their clients' interests, in the post-reform era. Competing banks discipline their analysts with worse career outcomes for producing biased reports, issuing shirking reports, and for involvement in the earnings guidance game, showing meaningful monitoring of their analysts. Highly reputable banks provide more monitoring discipline of their analysts and bonding of their moral hazard than other...
-
作者:Chang, Eric C.; Lin, Tse-Chun; Ma, Xiaorong
作者单位:University of Hong Kong; Shanghai Jiao Tong University; University of Macau
摘要:We explore the governance effect of short-selling threat on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We use equity lending supply (LS) to proxy for the threat, as short sellers incentives to scrutinize a firm depend on the availability of borrowing shares. Our results show that acquirers with higher LS have higher announcement returns. The effect is stronger when acquirers are more likely to be targets of subsequent hostile takeovers and when their managers wealth is more linked to stock prices. We con...
-
作者:Koonce, Lisa; Leitter, Zheng; White, Brian J.
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Nanyang Technological University
摘要:Certain financial statement items are closely related, such as items in hedging relationships. In this paper, we develop theory and conduct two experiments to investigate three different balance sheet presentation formats for related financial statement items. We posit that a linked presentation format rarely used in practice allows financial statement users to better distinguish among firms with different economics. Neither net presentation nor separate presentation of related balance sheet i...
-
作者:Bradshaw, Mark; Liao, Guanmin; Ma, Mark (Shuai)
作者单位:Boston University; Renmin University of China; American University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要:In state owned enterprises (SOEs), taxes are a dividend to the controlling shareholder, the state, but a cost to other shareholders. We examine publicly traded firms in China and find significantly lower tax avoidance by SOEs relative to non-SOEs. The differences are pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance evaluations. We link our results to managerial incentives through promotion tests, finding that higher SOE tax rates are associated wit...