Investment bank monitoring and bonding of security analysts' research

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Altinkilic, Oya; Balashov, Vadim S.; Hansen, Robert S.
• 署名单位: University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Camden; Tulane University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.08.016
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST; FORECAST ACCURACY; side analysts; stock recommendations; information asymmetry; EARNINGS FORECASTS; GLOBAL SETTLEMENT; capital-markets; AGENCY COSTS; reputation

摘要

We assess investment banks' influence over the agreement between their analysts' research behavior and their clients' interests, in the post-reform era. Competing banks discipline their analysts with worse career outcomes for producing biased reports, issuing shirking reports, and for involvement in the earnings guidance game, showing meaningful monitoring of their analysts. Highly reputable banks provide more monitoring discipline of their analysts and bonding of their moral hazard than other banks. The findings agree with the banks taking responsibility for aligning analysts' behavior with clients' interests.