Agency costs and tax planning when the government is a major Shareholder

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bradshaw, Mark; Liao, Guanmin; Ma, Mark (Shuai)
• 署名单位: Boston University; Renmin University of China; American University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.10.002
• 发表日期: 2019
• 关键词: State Ownership; corporate governance; ULTIMATE OWNERSHIP; career concerns; incentives; avoidance; privatization; tournaments; performance; MARKET

摘要

In state owned enterprises (SOEs), taxes are a dividend to the controlling shareholder, the state, but a cost to other shareholders. We examine publicly traded firms in China and find significantly lower tax avoidance by SOEs relative to non-SOEs. The differences are pronounced for locally versus centrally-owned SOEs and during the year of SOE term performance evaluations. We link our results to managerial incentives through promotion tests, finding that higher SOE tax rates are associated with higher promotion frequencies of SOE managers. Our results suggest managerial incentives and tax reporting are conditional on the ownership structure of the firm.