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作者:Rennekamp, Kristina M.; Sethuraman, Mani; Steenhoven, Blake A.
作者单位:Cornell University; Queens University - Canada
摘要:Research on conference calls documents that the question and answer (Q&A) portion is informative to markets. However, prior studies focus on the attributes of the participating individuals, primarily managers and analysts. We instead use the conversation as our unit of analysis, and examine whether conversational engagement between managers and ana-lysts in earnings calls is informative to market participants. Using an experiment, we first demonstrate that linguistic style matching (LSM), a fo...
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作者:Kang, Jung Koo; Lennox, Clive; Pandey, Vivek
作者单位:Harvard University; University of Southern California
摘要:We hypothesize that companies in the same product market avoid sharing the same audit partner when they are concerned about possible information spillovers. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that product market rivals are less likely to share the same partner when they perceive that information spillovers are more costly. While concerns about information spillovers significantly reduce the likelihood of product market rivals sharing the same audit partner, we find that such concerns do n...
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作者:Neilson, Jed J.
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要:Information gathering is an instinctive response to uncertainty, but such efforts may not fully resolve the uncertainty that prompted them. This implies that proxies for investor information gathering may endogenously reflect investor uncertainty, not only before but also after information collection. I find evidence consistent with this pattern using data on public internet access of SEC filings around firms' earnings announcements. My findings suggest that proxies for investor search and inf...
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作者:Truc Do; Zhang, Huai; Zuo, Luo
作者单位:University of Queensland; Nanyang Technological University; Cornell University
摘要:We argue that relative performance evaluation (RPE) contracts introduce a tournament among the focal firm and peer firms. We test whether a firm's riskiness is altered by its CEO's incentive to win the tournament. We find that a firm that performed poorly relative to its peers during an interim period takes more risk in the remainder of the evaluation period than a firm with better interim performance. This effect is stronger when the interim assessment date is closer to the end of the evaluat...
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作者:Dordzhieva, Aysa; Laux, Volker; Zheng, Ronghuo
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要:Firms that wish to raise capital from external investors can signal favorable private in-formation about their long-term prospects by publicly adopting a liberal accounting sys-tem that increases the probability of an overstated financial report. All else equal, the liberal bias deteriorates investors' ability to make efficient investment decisions, which increases the firm's cost of raising capital as investors price protect. But the fact that the firm is willing to adopt such a bias signals ...
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作者:Laurion, Henry; Sloan, Richard
作者单位:University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; University of Southern California
摘要:SEC rules require managers to reconcile their non-GAAP earnings forecasts with the most directly comparable GAAP forecasts unless doing so would entail 'unreasonable effort.' A significant number of managers rely on the unreasonable efforts exception to justify the omission of comparable GAAP forecasts. We analyze firms that rely on the unreasonable efforts exception and find that their non-GAAP earnings forecasts are more likely to exclude significant recurring expenses that are not excluded ...
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作者:Dichev, Ilia D.; Qian, Jingyi
作者单位:Emory University
摘要:This study explores whether NielsenIQ scanner data from U.S. retailers contain incremental information about the GAAP revenue of corresponding manufacturers. Using retail product/store/week data from 2006 to 2018, we construct a measure of aggregated consumer purchases at the manufacturer/quarter level, and find that it strongly predicts GAAP revenues. In addition, analyst forecasts of revenues have predictable errors, which implies that analysts do not fully incorporate the information in con...
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作者:Donelson, Dain C.; Kettell, Laura; McInnis, John; Toynbee, Sara
作者单位:University of Iowa; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要:Several recent studies argue that the adoption of universal demand (UD) laws represent an exogenous decline in litigation risk by increasing the procedural hurdles associated with shareholder derivative litigation. This study examines how UD laws affect the incidence of derivative litigation risk and related decisions. We show that the adoption of UD laws had no meaningful impact on derivative litigation from 1996 to 2015. We also find no evidence that UD laws affect aggressive accounting, vol...
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作者:Huang, Ying
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要:Government subsidies allocated by politicians are ultimately funded by taxpayers, who care about how tax money is spent and demand transparency. I argue that subsidized firms, as beneficiaries of government subsidies, have incentives to provide more disclo-sures to help politicians achieve a reputation for transparency as well as to lower their own costs from public scrutiny. Using a novel dataset that tracks government subsidies, I provide the first large-sample evidence on the relation betwe...
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作者:Chen, Gary; Tian, Xiaoli (Shaolee); Yu, Miaomiao
作者单位:University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; Georgetown University; Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; Georgetown University
摘要:We find that suppliers are more likely to redact mandated disclosures when major cus-tomers have proprietary information to protect (in the form of R&D intensity, trade secrets, and nondisclosure agreements), controlling for suppliers' own proprietary cost concerns. Furthermore, the effect on suppliers' redactions is concentrated in subsamples for which customers have greater power, measured by customer size, industry leadership, and the number of suppliers. Additionally, suppliers also curtai...