Redact to protect? Customers' incentive to protect information and suppliers' disclosure strategies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Gary; Tian, Xiaoli (Shaolee); Yu, Miaomiao
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; Georgetown University; Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; Georgetown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101490
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: proprietary information; CORPORATE DISCLOSURE; base concentration; competitive costs; bad news; profitability; performance; POWER; IMPACT; chain

摘要

We find that suppliers are more likely to redact mandated disclosures when major cus-tomers have proprietary information to protect (in the form of R&D intensity, trade secrets, and nondisclosure agreements), controlling for suppliers' own proprietary cost concerns. Furthermore, the effect on suppliers' redactions is concentrated in subsamples for which customers have greater power, measured by customer size, industry leadership, and the number of suppliers. Additionally, suppliers also curtail operations-related disclosures in the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) and product-and service-related press releases when customers likely have proprietary information to protect. Overall, these findings suggest that dependent suppliers internalize their customers' disclosure in-centives and curtail disclosures, catering to customers' demand for information protection.(c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.