Client concerns about information spillovers from sharing audit partners

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kang, Jung Koo; Lennox, Clive; Pandey, Vivek
• 署名单位: Harvard University; University of Southern California
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101434
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: industry expertise; PROPRIETARY INFORMATION; office-level; specialization; COMPETITION; Reputations; disclosure; decisions; QUALITY; mergers

摘要

We hypothesize that companies in the same product market avoid sharing the same audit partner when they are concerned about possible information spillovers. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that product market rivals are less likely to share the same partner when they perceive that information spillovers are more costly. While concerns about information spillovers significantly reduce the likelihood of product market rivals sharing the same audit partner, we find that such concerns do not deter them from sharing the same audit office. Lastly, when companies are unconcerned with information spillovers, our results suggest that partner sharing can be beneficial because it can result in lower audit fees and fewer accounting misstatements. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.