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作者：Francis, Jere R.; Neuman, Stevanie S.; Newton, Nathan J.
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Technology Sydney; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We investigate whether firms' tax planning affects the accuracy of analysts' forecasts. Tax planning can exacerbate the complexity of firms' operations through strategic choices to exploit tax laws. Because of its effect on firms' operations, tax planning can influence analysts' efforts to understand and forecast earnings. Specifically, if the additional complexity arising from tax planning makes firm attributes less representative of expected earnings, analysts may issue less accurate forecas...
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作者：Balakrishnan, Ramji; Drymiotes, George; Sivaramakrishnan, Konduru
作者单位：University of Iowa; Texas Christian University; Rice University
摘要：We examine a principal-agent setting in which the principal uses a performance measurement system for multiple purposes-to provide incentives and for retention decisions. The principal chooses the nature and extent of bias in the system, which determines whether the performance report is stringent, neutral, or lenient relative to the unobservable actual outcome. We show that when the report is used only for incentive purposes (an incentive role), stringency alleviates moral hazard. On the othe...
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作者：Kim, Jeong-Bon; Kim, Joung W.; Lim, Jee-Hae
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Nova Southeastern University; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa
摘要：We examine whether the use of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) for financial reporting (i.e., interactive data submissions) reduces earnings management during the period of XBRL implementation by the SEC. Using a sample of mandated XBRL filers, we compare the magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals in the XBRL adoption quarters with that in the non-adopting quarters. We also take advantage of staggered (three-stage phase-in) XBRL implementations to perform difference-in-diffe...
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作者：Dhaliwal, Dan; He, Wen; Li, Yan; Pereira, Raynolde
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Queensland; University of Melbourne; University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
摘要：We empirically examine whether adopting a uniform set of accounting standards mitigates information frictions in financial markets and facilitates market integration. Using a difference-in-difference design, we find that after the mandatory adoption of IFRS local stock returns incorporate more global information and at a faster speed. The effect of IFRS adoption is stronger in countries where there are larger improvements in accounting comparability and for firms with a larger increase in fore...
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作者：Hung, Shengmin; Pan, Hunghua; Wang, Taychang
作者单位：Soochow University; National Tsing Hua University; National Taiwan University
摘要：This study examines the rather controversial practice of managerial hedging, which allows CEOs to delink their compensation from stock price performance. We presume that boards are aware of these practices and adjust the weights placed on accounting-based and stock-based performance measures in executive compensation contracts to mitigate the problem. Empirically, we find that, in the presence of managerial hedging opportunities, accounting-based performance measures receive more weight, where...
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作者：Arya, Anil; Mittendorf, Brian; Yoon, Dae-Hee
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Yonsei University
摘要：Firms' reluctance at times to publicly disclose financial information is often attributed to concern that the information may be used against them by self-interested outside parties. These outside parties may interact with the firm in the horizontal realm (e.g., retail competitors) or in the vertical arena (e.g., wholesale suppliers). This article is built on the premise that fully understanding the strategic consequences of disclosure requires joint consideration of horizontal and vertical re...
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作者：Carrington, Thomas; Johansson, Tobias; Johed, Gustav; Ohman, Peter
作者单位：Stockholm University; Orebro University; Stockholm School of Economics; Mid-Sweden University
摘要：Based on an analysis of questionnaire data from a large sample of certified auditors, we examine how the main type of client being served influences auditor conformity to the core values of their profession. We contrast auditors of (primarily) listed companies with auditors of (primarily) single member companies, that is, limited liability companies with a single owner who typically is also the only employee of the company. We show that these two groups of auditors differ in the extent to whic...
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作者：Maber, David A.
作者单位：California State University System; California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo
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作者：Baloria, Vishal P.; Klassen, Kenneth J.; Wiedman, Christine I.
作者单位：Boston College; University of Waterloo
摘要：Demand for disclosures on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues has increased dramatically. Using corporate political spending disclosures as our setting, we conduct a detailed inquiry of 541 political spending-related shareholder proposals from 2004 to 2012 to highlight the role of shareholder activism as a mechanism to motivate ESG disclosure. Unlike earlier studies, we examine both proposals that went to a vote and proposals that were withdrawn by the activist, allowing us to a...
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作者：Chung, Sung Gon; Goh, Beng Wee; Lee, Jimmy; Shevlin, Terry
作者单位：Wayne State University; Singapore Management University; University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：We examine the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and the profitability of insider trading under the assumption that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism. We document that insider purchase profitability, but not sales profitability, is significantly higher on average in more tax aggressive firms. We also find that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is attenuated for firms with more effective monitoring and is a...
