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作者：He, Yanan; Tan, Hun-Tong; Yeo, Feng; Zhang, Jixun
作者单位：Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting & Finance; Nanyang Technological University; University of South Carolina System; University of South Carolina Columbia; Nankai University
摘要：Disclosure standards mandate the quantitative disclosure of hedging-instrument-related risks but not the disclosure of hedged-item-related risks. We examine how a match (mismatch) in formats, caused by making quantitative (qualitative) hedged item disclosures alongside quantitative hedging instrument disclosures, affects investors' integration of information from these two related disclosures. Our first experiment varies the hedged item disclosure format (quantitative or qualitative) and the p...
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作者：Lisic, Ling Lei; Myers, Linda A.; Seidel, Timothy A.; Zhou, Jian
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; Brigham Young University; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa
摘要：In this study, we examine whether audit committee accounting expertise helps to promote audit quality by motivating auditors to conduct diligent internal control audits and make appropriate internal control assessments because audit committee accounting expertise safeguards auditors from dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. Among clients with existing and likely internal control material weaknesses (as proxied by future restatements of audited financial statements), we find a...
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作者：Glover, Jonathan; Levine, Carolyn B.
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Delaware
摘要：This article studies contracts between a principal and an agent that are robust to information asymmetries about measurement quality. Our main result is that an information asymmetry about measurement quality not only reduces the usefulness of a given performance measure for stewardship purposes, it also qualitatively changes the way the performance measure is used if the information asymmetry is sufficiently large. We also study the manipulability of performance measures, assuming that poor m...
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作者：Bathke, Allen W., Jr.; Mason, Terry W.; Morton, Richard M.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; Kansas State University
摘要：Prior literature suggests that the market underreacts to the positive correlation in a typical firm's seasonal earnings changes, which leads to a post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) in prices. We examine the market reaction for a distinct set of firms whose seasonal earnings changes are uncorrelated and show that the market incorrectly assumes that the earnings changes of these firms are positively correlated. We also document that positive (negative) seasonal earnings changes in the curre...
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作者：Ayres, Douglas R.; Neal, Terry L.; Reid, Lauren C.; Shipman, Jonathan E.
作者单位：Butler University; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; Wake Forest University; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville
摘要：The elimination of goodwill amortization in 2001 brought about significant change in how companies are required to account for goodwill. This change in accounting also brought with it new challenges for auditors, namely evaluating the reasonableness of management's assumptions related to goodwill valuation. In addition to introducing technical challenges, this task is particularly difficult given the misalignment in incentives it creates between managers who likely prefer to avoid recording an...
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作者：Krishnan, Ranjani
作者单位：Michigan State University
摘要：This article discusses Glover and Levine (2019). It summarizes Glover and Levine's model, its contributions, and practical implications. It also suggests empirical extensions based on the predictions of the model.
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作者：Hofmann, Christian; Rothenberg, Naomi R.
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Alberta
摘要：We study a principal's choice of whether to produce an imperfect forecast about a firm's outcome either before or after an agent's effort choice. The early forecast affects the agent's effort choice, which means the forecast can also be used to infer information about the effect of the agent's effort on outcome. The late forecast is more accurate because, by working hard, the agent also learns about productivity, implying that the late forecast has an additional performance measurement role. W...
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作者：Glover, Steven M.; Taylor, Mark H.; Wu, Yi-Jing
作者单位：Brigham Young University; State University System of Florida; University of South Florida; Texas Tech University System; Texas Tech University
摘要：Reported deficiencies continue to persist in audits of fair value measurements and other complex accounting estimates (hereafter, FVMs), despite improvements in auditor performance observed by regulators. The persistence of reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs suggests that factors underlying this trend may be more complicated and multidimensional than previously suggested by regulators and academic research, which has focused largely on auditors' unsatisfactory performance as the principal...
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作者：Heese, Jonas
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：I examine whether political influence as a response to voters' interest in employment levels is reflected in the enforcement actions of the SEC. I find that large employers are less likely to experience SEC enforcement actions. Next, I examine whether variations in politicians' sensitivity to employment levels result in variations in enforcement against large employers. I find that large employers are less likely to face enforcement actions during presidential elections if they are based in po...
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作者：Kadous, Kathryn; Zhou, Yuepin (Daniel)
作者单位：Emory University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Intrinsic motivation is generally thought to be positively associated with performance on a variety of tasks. However, there is only sparse experimental evidence supporting this idea and we know little about the specific mechanisms behind any effect. We develop theory about how auditors' intrinsic motivation for their jobs can improve their judgments about complex accounting estimates. We experimentally test whether a prompt to make auditors' intrinsic motivation for their jobs salient improve...
