2期

最新文章

• Open versus closed loop capacity equilibria in electricity markets under perfect and oligopolistic competition AI翻译
  作者：Wogrin, S.; Hobbs, B. F.; Ralph, D.; Centeno, E.; Barquin, J.
  作者单位：Comillas Pontifical University; Johns Hopkins University; Johns Hopkins University; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
  摘要：We consider two game-theoretic models of the generation capacity expansion problem in liberalized electricity markets. The first is an open loop equilibrium model, where generation companies simultaneously choose capacities and quantities to maximize their individual profit. The second is a closed loop model, in which companies first choose capacities maximizing their profit anticipating the market equilibrium outcomes in the second stage. The latter problem is an equilibrium problem with equi...
• Risk adjusted discounted cash flows in capacity expansion models AI翻译
  作者：Ehrenmann, Andreas; Smeers, Yves
  作者单位：Engie; Universite Catholique Louvain
  摘要：This paper addresses a problem that is typical of multi-period capacity expansion equilibrium models: plants or sectors have different risk exposures that may warrant different costs of capital. The paper examines modifications of a capacity expansion model interpreted in equilibrium terms to account for asset-specific costs of capital.
• A model and approach to the challenge posed by optimal power systems planning AI翻译
  作者：O'Neill, Richard P.; Krall, Eric A.; Hedman, Kory W.; Oren, Shmuel S.
  作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
  摘要：Currently, there is a need to plan and analyze the electric power transmission system in greater detail and over larger geographic areas. Existing models approach the problem from different perspectives. Each model addresses different aspects of and has different approximations to the optimal planning process. In order to scope out the huge challenge of optimal transmission planning, this paper presents a new modeling approach for inter-regional planning and investment in a competitive environ...
• Liquidity risks on power exchanges: a generalized Nash equilibrium model AI翻译
  作者：d'Aertrycke, Gauthier de Maere; Smeers, Yves
  作者单位：Fondazione Mattei; Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici (CMCC); Engie; Universite Catholique Louvain
  摘要：The extreme volatility of electricity prices makes their financial derivatives important instruments for asset managers. Even if the volume of derivative contracts traded on Power Exchanges has been growing since the inception of the restructuring of the sector, electricity remains considerably less liquid than other commodity markets. This paper assesses the effect of limited liquidity in power exchanges using an equilibrium model where agents cannot hedge up to their desired level. Mathemati...
• Tacit collusion games in pool-based electricity markets under transmission constraints AI翻译
  作者：Liu, Andrew L.; Hobbs, Benjamin F.
  作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Johns Hopkins University
  摘要：Harrington et al. (Math Program Ser B 104:407-435, 2005) introduced a general framework for modeling tacit collusion in which producing firms collectively maximize the Nash bargaining objective function, subject to incentive compatibility constraints. This work extends that collusion model to the setting of a competitive pool-based electricity market operated by an independent system operator. The extension has two features. First, the locationally distinct markets in which firms compete are c...