Tacit collusion games in pool-based electricity markets under transmission constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Liu, Andrew L.; Hobbs, Benjamin F.
• 署名单位: Purdue University System; Purdue University; Johns Hopkins University
• 刊物名称: MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-5610
• DOI: 10.1007/s10107-013-0693-5
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 351-379
• 关键词: POWER; price; england; equilibrium; systems

摘要

Harrington et al. (Math Program Ser B 104:407-435, 2005) introduced a general framework for modeling tacit collusion in which producing firms collectively maximize the Nash bargaining objective function, subject to incentive compatibility constraints. This work extends that collusion model to the setting of a competitive pool-based electricity market operated by an independent system operator. The extension has two features. First, the locationally distinct markets in which firms compete are connected by transmission lines. Capacity limits of the transmission lines, together with the laws of physics that guide the flow of electricity, may alter firms' strategic behavior. Second, in addition to electricity power producers, other market participants, including system operators and power marketers, play important roles in a competitive electricity market. The new players are included in the model in order to better represent real-world markets, and this inclusion will impact power producers' strategic behavior as well. The resulting model is a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). Properties of the specific MPEC are discussed and numerical examples illustrating the impacts of transmission congestion in a collusive game are presented.