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作者：Parssian, A; Sarkar, S; Jacob, VS
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Springfield; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：The cost associated with making decisions based on poor-quality data is quite high. Consequently, the management of data quality and the quality of associated data management processes has become critical for organizations. An important first step in managing data quality is the ability to measure the quality of information products (derived data) based on the quality of the source data and associated processes used to produce the information outputs. We present a methodology to determine two ...
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作者：Chen, KY; Fine, LR; Huberman, BA
作者单位：Hewlett-Packard
摘要：We present a novel methodology for identifying public knowledge and eliminating the biases it creates when aggregating information in small group settings. A two-stage mechanism consisting of an information market and a coordination game is used to reveal and adjust for individuals' public information. A nonlinear aggregation of their decisions then allows for the calculation of the probability of the future outcome of an uncertain event, which can then be compared to both the objective probab...
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作者：Parlaktürk, AK; Kumar, S
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study self-interested routing in stochastic networks, taking into account the discrete stochastic dynamics of such networks. We analyze a two-station multiclass queueing network in which the system manager chooses the scheduling rule and individual customers choose routes in a self-interested manner. We show that this network can be unstable in Nash equilibrium under some scheduling rules. We also design a nontrivial scheduling rule that negates the performance degradation resulting from se...
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作者：Jarrar, R; Martín-Herrán, G; Zaccour, G
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Universidad de Valladolid
摘要：We propose a numerical approach to compute stationary Markov perfect Nash equilibrium advertising strategies of the Lanchester model. The algorithm can be implemented using a standard mathematical package, and, importantly, it does not require that the players discount their future earnings at a zero rate, an assumption that has been made in the literature.
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作者：Afèche, P; Mendelson, H
作者单位：Northwestern University; Stanford University
摘要：This paper studies alternative price-service mechanisms for a provider that serves customers whose delay cost depends on their service valuations. We propose a generalized delay cost structure that augments the standard additive model with a multiplicative component, capturing the interdependence between delay cost and values. We derive and compare the revenue-maximizing and socially optimal equilibria under uniform pricing, preemptive, and nonpreemptive priority auctions with an admission pri...
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作者：Denrell, J
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Strategy is concerned with sustained interfirm profitability differences. Observations of such sustained differences are often attributed to unobserved systematic a priori differences in firm characteristics. This paper shows that sustained interfirm profitability differences may be very likely even if there are no a priori differences among firms. As a result of the phenomenon of long leads in random walks, even a random resource accumulation process is likely to produce persistent resource h...
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作者：de Boer, PT; Kroese, DP; Rubinstein, RY
作者单位：University of Twente; University of Queensland; Technion Israel Institute of Technology
摘要：In this paper, we propose a fast adaptive importance sampling method for the efficient simulation of buffer overflow probabilities in queueing networks. The method comprises three stages. First, we estimate the minimum cross-entropy tilting parameter for a small buffer level; next, we use this as a starting value for the estimation of the optimal tilting parameter for the actual (large) buffer level. Finally, the tilting parameter just found is used to estimate the overflow probability of inte...
