Low-revenue equilibria in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R; Kahn, CM
• 署名单位: University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0339
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 508-518
• 关键词: Auctions; Bidding; collusion

摘要

Low-revenue equilibria allow participants in an auction to obtain goods at prices lower than would prevail in a competitive market. These outcomes are generated as perfect equilibria of ascending-bid, multiunit auctions. We show that these equilibria are possible under mild conditions-conditions that are likely to prevail in many situations where auction formats have recently been adopted We argue that these equilibria could explain the low revenues of some recent auctions, and discuss potential remedies to eliminate low-revenue equilibria.