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作者：Kim, Jerry W.; King, Brayden G.
作者单位：Columbia University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper tests the assumption that evaluators are biased to positively evaluate high-status individuals, irrespective of quality. Using unique data from Major League Baseball umpires' evaluation of pitch quality, which allow us to observe the difference in a pitch's objective quality and in its perceived quality as judged by the umpire, we show that umpires are more likely to overrecognize quality by expanding the strike zone, and less likely to underrecognize quality by missing pitches in t...
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作者：Caro, Felipe; Martinez-de-Albeniz, Victor; Rusmevichientong, Paat
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Navarra; IESE Business School; University of Southern California
摘要：Motivated by retailers' frequent introduction of new items to refresh product lines and maintain their market shares, we present the assortment packing problem in which a firm must decide, in advance, the release date of each product in a given collection over a selling season. Our formulation models the trade-offs among profit margins, preference weights, and limited life cycles. A key aspect of the problem is that each product is short-lived in the sense that, once introduced, its attractive...
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作者：Davis, Andrew M.; Katok, Elena; Santamaria, Natalia
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：In this paper we experimentally investigate how the allocation of inventory risk in a two-stage supply chain affects channel efficiency and profit distribution. We first evaluate two common wholesale price contracts that differ in which party incurs the risk associated with unsold inventory: a push contract in which the retailer incurs the risk and a pull contract in which the supplier incurs the risk. Our experimental results show that a pull contract achieves higher channel efficiency than t...
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作者：Indjejikian, Raffi; Lu, Hai; Yang, Liyan
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Toronto
摘要：Empirical evidence suggests that information leakage in capital markets is common. We present a trading model to study the incentives of an informed trader (e. g., a well-informed insider) to voluntarily leak information about an asset's value to one or more independent traders. Our model shows that, although leaking information dissipates the insider's information advantage about the asset's value, it enhances his information advantage about the asset's execution price relative to other infor...
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作者：Gartenberg, Claudine
作者单位：New York University
摘要：It is widely acknowledged that the 2007 mortgage crisis was preceded by a broad deterioration in underwriting diligence. This paper shows that this deterioration varied by the industry affiliation of mortgage lenders. Loans issued by homebuilders and stand-alone lenders were significantly less likely to default than loans issued by depository banks and affiliates of major financial institutions. I argue that homebuilders and stand-alone lenders had the least financial capacity to hold mortgage...
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作者：Drexler, Alejandro; Schoar, Antoinette
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We show that the cost of employee turnover in firms that rely on decentralized knowledge and personal relationships depends on the firms' planning horizons and the departing employees' incentives to transfer information. Using exogenous shocks to the relationship between borrowers and loan officers, we document that borrowers whose loan officers are on leave are less likely to receive new loans from the bank, are more likely to apply for credit from other banks, and are more likely to miss pay...
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作者：Xu, Linli; Wilbur, Kenneth C.; Siddarth, S.; Silva-Risso, Jorge M.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Southern California; University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：The central prediction of the current paper is that manufacturer price advertising may be a less effective tool for influencing demand than retailer price advertising. We manipulate the source of a price advertisement in an experiment run on a sample of pickup truck owners. Manufacturer price advertising leads to lower indicators of potential demand than dealer price advertising, even among consumers who are experienced with the brand. An econometric analysis of pickup truck sales, price, and ...
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作者：Eccles, Robert G.; Ioannou, Ioannis; Serafeim, George
作者单位：Harvard University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：We investigate the effect of corporate sustainability on organizational processes and performance. Using a matched sample of 180 U. S. companies, we find that corporations that voluntarily adopted sustainability policies by 1993-termed as high sustainability companies-exhibit by 2009 distinct organizational processes compared to a matched sample of companies that adopted almost none of these policies-termed as low sustainability companies. The boards of directors of high sustainability compani...
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作者：Adner, Ron; Csaszar, Felipe A.; Zemsky, Peter B.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; INSEAD Business School
摘要：Competitive positioning is a central, yet understudied, topic in strategy. Understanding positioning requires understanding two distinct mappings: how underlying policies are transformed into positions, and how positions are transformed into market performance. A complete treatment of positioning requires incorporating organizational design in the presence of policy interdependence; consumer choice in the presence of trade-offs among multiple product attributes; and competitive interactions am...
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作者：Ang, Andrew; Papanikolaou, Dimitris; Westerfield, Mark M.
作者单位：Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Northwestern University; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：We present a model of optimal allocation to liquid and illiquid assets, where illiquidity risk results from the restriction that an asset cannot be traded for intervals of uncertain duration. Illiquidity risk leads to increased and state-dependent risk aversion and reduces the allocation to both liquid and illiquid risky assets. Uncertainty about the length of the illiquidity interval, as opposed to a deterministic nontrading interval, is a primary determinant of the cost of illiquidity. We al...
