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作者：Gneezy, Uri; Imas, Alex; Madarasz, Kristof
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of Amsterdam; Carnegie Mellon University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper presents theory and experiments where people's prosocial attitudes fluctuate over time following the violation of an internalized norm. We report the results of two experiments in which people who first made an immoral choice were then more likely to donate to charity than those who did not. In addition, those who knew that a donation opportunity would follow the potentially immoral choice behaved more unethically than those who did not know. We interpret this increase in charitable...
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作者：Perakis, Georgia; Sun, Wei
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); International Business Machines (IBM); IBM USA
摘要：We consider Cournot competition in the presence of congestion effects. Our model consists of several service providers with differentiated services, each competing for users who are sensitive to both price and congestion. We distinguish two types of congestion effects, depending on whether spillover costs exist, that is, where one service provider's congestion cost increases with the other providers' output level. We quantify the efficiency of an unregulated oligopoly with respect to the optim...
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作者：Grossman, Zachary
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：Participants in dictator games frequently avoid learning whether their choice to maximize their own earnings will help or hurt the recipient and then choose selfishly, exploiting the moral wiggle room provided by their ignorance. However, this is found in an environment in which the dictator must actively learn the true payoffs, so inaction means ignorance. Does this effect persist when one must actively choose either to be ignorant or to be informed or when one must actively choose to remain ...
