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作者：Serpa, Juan Camilo; Krishnan, Harish
作者单位：McGill University; University of British Columbia
摘要：Firms in a vertical relationship are likely to affect each other's productivity. Exactly how does productivity spill over across this type of relationship (i.e., through which mechanisms)? Additionally, how does the relative importance of these mechanisms depend on the structure of the supply chain? To answer these questions, we decompose the channels of upstream productivity spillovers-from customers to suppliers-by developing a structural econometric model on a sample of approximately 22,500...
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作者：Hooshangi, Soheil; Loewenstein, George
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
摘要：Using a novel experimental paradigm, we explore how the experience of generating an idea and the possibility that another investor might adopt a rejected investment opportunity, bias the investment decisions of innovator and imitator entrepreneurs. We find that individuals who generate a business idea form biased evaluations of the economic potential of ideas, be it their own idea or somebody else's idea. On the one hand, they are overconfident about the value of, and overly likely to invest i...
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作者：Tunca, Tunay I.; Zhu, Weiming
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要：Small suppliers often face challenges to obtain financing for their operations. Especially in developing economies, traditional financing methods can be very costly or unavailable to such suppliers. To reduce channel costs, large buyers have recently begun implementing their own financing methods that intermediate between suppliers and financing institutions. In this paper, we analyze the role and efficiency of buyer intermediation in supplier financing. Building a game-theoretical model, we s...
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作者：Carpenter, Jeffrey; Robbett, Andrea; Akbar, Prottoy A.
作者单位：Middlebury College; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Despite the 1/N problem associated with profit sharing, the empirical literature finds that sharing profits with workers has a positive impact on work team and firm performance. We examine one possible resolution to this puzzle by observing that, although the incentive to work harder under profit sharing is weak, it might be sufficient to motivate workers to report each other for shirking, especially if the workers are reciprocally minded. Our model provides the rationale for this conjecture, ...
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作者：Negoescu, Diana M.; Bimpikis, Kostas; Brandeau, Margaret L.; Iancu, Dan A.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Stanford University; Stanford University
摘要：Currently available medication for treating many chronic diseases is often effective only for a subgroup of patients, and biomarkers accurately assessing whether an individual belongs to this subgroup typically do not exist. In such settings, physicians learn about the effectiveness of a drug primarily through experimentation-i.e., by initiating treatment and monitoring the patient's response. Precise guidelines for discontinuing treatment are often lacking or left entirely to the physician's ...
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作者：Wang, Ruxian; Sahin, Ozge
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：Consumers search for product information to resolve valuation uncertainties before purchase. We incorporate search cost into consumer choice models and study the two-stage consider then choose policy. In the first stage, a consumer forms her consideration set by balancing utility uncertainty and search cost. In the second stage, she evaluates all products in her consideration set and chooses the one with the highest net utility. We show that the revenue-ordered assortment (i.e., the offer set ...
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作者：Kagan, Evgeny; Leider, Stephen; Lovejoy, William S.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Bringing a new product to market involves both a creative ideation stage and an execution stage. When time-to-market constraints are binding, important questions are how to divide limited time between the two stages and who should make this decision. We introduce a laboratory experiment that closely resembles this setting: it features a product development task with an open design space, a downstream cost increase, and two development stages. We show that performance is significantly worse whe...
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作者：Gil, Ricard; Ruzzier, Christian A.
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Universidad de San Andres Argentina
摘要：This paper empirically investigates whether changes in product market competition affect firm boundaries. Exploiting regulation-induced shocks to entry barriers and differences in regulation enforcement across cities to obtain exogenous variation in competition, we establish a negative causal effect of competition (through reduced entry barriers and a larger number of rival firms) on vertical integration in the setting of the Spanish local television industry between 1995 and 2002.
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作者：Morewedge, Carey K.; Tang, Simone; Larrick, Richard P.
作者单位：Boston University; Duke University
摘要：We examined whether people reduce the impact of negative outcomes through emotional hedging-betting against the occurrence of desired outcomes. We found substantial reluctance to bet against the success of preferred U.S. presidential candidates and Major League Baseball, National Football League, National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) basketball, and NCAA hockey teams. This reluctance was not attributable to optimism or a general aversion to hedging. Reluctance to hedge desired outcom...
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作者：Coviello, Decio; Guglielmo, Andrea; Spagnolo, Giancarlo
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; Analysis Group Inc.; Stockholm School of Economics; University of Rome Tor Vergata
摘要：We run a regression discontinuity design analysis to document the causal effect of increasing buyers' discretion on procurement outcomes in a large database for public works in Italy. Works with a value above a given threshold have to be awarded through an open auction. Works below this threshold can be more easily awarded through a restricted auction, where the buyer has some discretion in terms of who (not) to invite to bid. Our main result is that discretion increases the probability that t...
