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作者：Behr, Patrick; Kisgen, Darren J.; Taillard, Jerome P.
作者单位：Boston College; Babson College
摘要：Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations in 1975 gave select rating agencies increased market power by increasing both barriers to entry and the reliance on ratings for regulations. We test whether these regulations led to ratings inflation. We find that defaults and negative financial changes are more likely for firms given the same rating if the rating was assigned after the SEC action. Furthermore, firms initially rated Baa in the post-regulation period are 19% more likely to be...
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作者：Huffman, David; Bognanno, Michael
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University
摘要：A previous literature cautions that paying workers for performance might crowd out nonmonetary motives towork hard. Empirical evidence from the field, however, has been based on between-subjects designs that are best suited for detecting crowding out due to low-powered incentives. High-powered incentives in the workplace tend to increase output, but it is unknown whether this masks crowding out. This paper uses a within-subject experimental design and finds evidence that crowding out also exte...
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作者：Kausar, Asad
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University
摘要：This paper examines whether earnings levels predict future returns distinct from earnings changes. I find that the predictive ability of earnings levels is subsumed by and is not incremental to the predictive ability of earnings changes. Specifically, I find that trading strategies based on net income, operating profitability, and gross profitability do not earn significant abnormal returns after controlling for earnings changes. My evidence suggests that these anomalies are an artifact of pos...
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作者：LaRiviere, Jacob; McMahon, Matthew; Neilson, William
作者单位：Microsoft; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Little Rock; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville
摘要：Two competing principal-agent models explain why firms pay dividends. The substitute model proposes that corporate insiders pay dividends to signal and build trust with outside shareholders who lack legal protection. The outcome model, in contrast, surmises that when shareholders have legal protection, they demand dividends from insiders to prevent them from expropriating corporate funds. Either way, dividends represent an agency cost paid to align the interests of shareholders and insiders. E...
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作者：Wu, Lynn; Jin, Fujie; Hitt, Lorin M.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：This study examines how characteristics of an interfirm labor-flow network affect firm productivity. Using employee job histories to trace labor movement between organizations, we construct labor-flow networks for both information technology (IT) and non-IT labor and analyze how a firm's network structure for the two types of labor affects its performance. We find that hiring IT workers from a structurally diverse network of firms can substantially improve firm productivity, but that the same ...
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作者：Atasoy, Hilal; Chen, Pei-yu; Ganju, Kartik
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Temple University; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; McGill University
摘要：Electronic health records (EHR) are often presumed to reduce the significant and accelerating healthcare costs in the United States. However, evidence on the relationship between EHR adoption and costs is mixed, leading to skepticism about the effectiveness of EHR in decreasing costs. We argue that simply looking at the hospital-level effects can be misleading because the benefits of EHR can go beyond the adopting hospital by creating regional spillovers via information and patient sharing. Wh...
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作者：Burtch, Gordon; Hong, Yili; Bapna, Ravi; Griskevicius, Vladas
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：In hopes of motivating consumers to provide larger volumes of useful reviews, many retailers offer financial incentives. Here, we explore an alternative approach, social norms. We inform individuals about the volume of reviews authored by peers. We test the effectiveness of using financial incentives, social norms, and a combination of both strategies in motivating consumers. In two randomized experiments, one in the field conducted in partnership with a large online clothing retailer based in...
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作者：Chellappa, Ramnath K.; Mehra, Amit
作者单位：Emory University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：In this paper, we extend the understanding of versioning strategy of an information goods monopolist and provide new insights on when versioning is optimal. To do so, we derive the optimal product line or versions of an information good and the corresponding prices. By relaxing common assumptions on consumers' usage costs, versioning costs and capital research and development costs, we provide new insights as well as reconcile extant findings on versioning. For a good with no-free-disposal (NF...
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作者：Papanastasiou, Yiangos; Bimpikis, Kostas; Savva, Nicos
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University; University of London; London Business School
摘要：Motivated by the proliferation of online platforms that collect and disseminate consumers' experiences with alternative substitutable products/ services, we investigate the problem of optimal information provision when the goal is to maximize aggregate consumer surplus. We develop a decentralized multiarmed bandit framework where a forward- looking principal (the platform designer) commits up front to a policy that dynamically discloses information regarding the history of outcomes to a series...
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作者：Kim, E. Han; Lu, Yao
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University
摘要：The executive suite and the board are closely bound to each other through their fiduciary responsibility to the same shareholders. With chief executive officers' (CEOs) prominent role in both governing bodies, their independence from CEOs' self-serving behavior might be related to each other. We explore the interdependence using an external shock increasing board independence. The shock weakens executive suite independence by increasing CEO connectedness within executive suites through appoint...
