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作者:Gallant, A. Ronald; Hong, Han; Khwaja, Ahmed
作者单位:Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Stanford University; University of Cambridge
摘要:This paper examines whether experience from entry in one market can potentially enhance profitability at a future market opportunity for a related product. We formulate and estimate a dynamic game of entry in which forward-looking firms make decisions not just based on present benefits of past entry but also anticipating potential future benefits of current entry. Dynamic spillovers of entry are incorporated through a firm-specific unobservable (to the researcher) cost that depends on past ent...
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作者:Ajorlou, Amir; Jadbabaie, Ali; Kakhbod, Ali
作者单位:Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:We study the problem of optimal dynamic pricing for a monopolist selling a product to consumers in a social network. In the proposed model, the only means of spread of information about the product is via word-of-mouth communication; consumers' knowledge of the product is only through friends who already know about the product's existence. Both buyers and nonbuyers contribute to information diffusion, while buyers are more likely to spread the news about the product. By analyzing the structure...
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作者:Demange, Gabrielle
作者单位:Paris School of Economics
摘要:This paper proposes to measure the spillover effects that cross liabilities generate on the magnitude of default in a system of financially linked institutions. Based on a simple model and an explicit criterion-the aggregate debt repayments-the measure is defined for each institution, affected by its characteristics and links to others. These measures-one for each institution-summarize relevant information on the interaction between the liabilities structure and the shocks to resources, and th...
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作者:Schweitzer, Maurice E.; Ho, Teck-Hua; Zhang, Xing
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; National University of Singapore; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要:Monitoring changes the behavior of those who are monitored and those who monitor others. We studied behavior under different monitoring regimes in repeated trust games. We found that trustees behaved opportunistically when they anticipated monitoring-they were compliant when they knew in advance that they would be monitored, but exploited trustors when they knew in advance that they would not be monitored. Interestingly, trustors failed to anticipate how strategically their counterparts would ...
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作者:Doshi, Hitesh; Kumar, Praveen; Yerramilli, Vijay
作者单位:University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要:We use forward-looking and exogenous measures of output price uncertainty to examine the effect of price uncertainty on firm-level capital investment, risk management, and debt issuance. The effects of uncertainty vary significantly by firm size. When faced with high price uncertainty, large firms increase their hedging intensity but do not lower capital investment or debt issuance. In contrast, small firms do not adjust their hedging intensity but significantly lower capital expenditure and d...
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作者:Balseiro, Santiago R.; Mirrokni, Vahab S.; Leme, Renato Paes
作者单位:Columbia University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要:We study the dynamic mechanism design problem of a seller who repeatedly sells independent items to a buyer with private values. In this setting, the seller could potentially extract the entire buyer surplus by running efficient auctions and charging an upfront participation fee at the beginning of the horizon. In some markets, such as Internet advertising, participation fees are not practical since buyers expect to inspect items before purchasing them. This motivates us to study the design of...
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作者:Chew, Soo Hong; Yi, Junjian; Zhang, Junsen; Zhong, Songfa
作者单位:National University of Singapore; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要:We study the role of risk aversion underlying son preference in patriarchal societies, where sons serve as better insurance for old-age support than daughters. The implications of an insurance motive on son preference are twofold. First, prior to the birth of their children, more-risk-averse parents have a stronger preference for sons than for daughters. Second, after the birth of their children, parents with sons are more risk seeking, compared to parents with daughters. We adopt a within-twi...
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作者:Garofalo, Orsola; Rott, Christina
作者单位:Copenhagen Business School; Maastricht University
摘要:Decision makers frequently have a spokesperson communicate their decisions. In this paper, we address two questions. First, does it matter who communicates an unfair decision? Second, does it matter how the unfair decision is communicated? We conduct a modified dictator game experiment in which either the decision maker or a spokesperson communicates the decided allocation to recipients, who then determine whether to punish either of them. We find that receivers punish both the decision maker ...
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作者:Liberti, Jose Maria
作者单位:Northwestern University; DePaul University
摘要:This paper examines how organizational form affects incentives inside a financial institution. Using unique organization-level data, I exploit a change to the hierarchical organization to test whether delegation of authority and reduction of oversight improve the provision of effort by loan officers. I find that empowering loan officers increases their effort in producing and using soft information in their lending decisions. Consistent with the incentive view of delegation, loan officers who ...
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作者:Yang, Nan; Lim, Yong Long
作者单位:National University of Singapore
摘要:We show that temporary incentives can lead to lasting changes in people's daily routines through a field experiment. In randomized controlled trials on Singapore's subways, commuters in the treatment group received a full rebate of their fares for 10 weeks if they exited fare gates before the start of morning peak-travel time. The objective of the fare promotion was to alleviate peak-time congestion by encouraging commuters to travel prepeak. This promotion resembles an actual public program i...