How Monitoring Influences Trust: A Tale of Two Faces

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schweitzer, Maurice E.; Ho, Teck-Hua; Zhang, Xing
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; National University of Singapore; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2016.2586
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 253-270
• 关键词: trust; Compliance; monitoring; strategic behavior

摘要

Monitoring changes the behavior of those who are monitored and those who monitor others. We studied behavior under different monitoring regimes in repeated trust games. We found that trustees behaved opportunistically when they anticipated monitoring-they were compliant when they knew in advance that they would be monitored, but exploited trustors when they knew in advance that they would not be monitored. Interestingly, trustors failed to anticipate how strategically their counterparts would behave. Trustors misattributed the strategic, compliant behavior they observed as signals of trustees' trustworthiness. As a result, trustors misplaced their trust when they were unable to monitor their counterparts. We discuss the managerial implications of our results for designing and implementing monitoring systems.