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作者：Chun, So Yeon; Ovchinnikov, Anton
作者单位：Georgetown University; Queens University - Canada; INSEAD Business School
摘要：We study the interaction between the design of a premium-status loyalty program, revenue management, and strategic consumer behavior. Specifically, we consider a contemporaneous change where firms across several industries switch their loyalty programs from quantity-based toward spending-based designs. This change has been met with fierce opposition from the media and consumers. Building on the microfoundations of strategic, forward-looking, and status-seeking consumer behavior, we endogenize ...
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作者：Leland, Jonathan W.; Schneider, Mark; Wilcox, Nathaniel T.
作者单位：National Science Foundation (NSF); University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：Behavior differs between transparent and nontransparent presentations of decisions, but transparent presentation has not been precisely defined. We formally define transparent frames for risk and time, establish their uniqueness, provide algorithms for constructing them, and compare them with standard presentation formats. A logic emerges for predicting systematic shifts in choice under risk and over time, and how violations of rational choice theory will depend on frames. An experiment verifi...
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作者：Li, Si; Zhan, Xintong
作者单位：Wilfrid Laurier University; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper examines the effect of product market threats on firms' stock crash risk. Competitive pressure from the product market aggravates managers' incentive to withhold negative information. When negative information is accumulated to a tipping point, the accumulated information comes out all at once and leads to an abrupt and large decline in stock price. Using a measure of product market threats, our regressions find that firms facing more threats are more prone to stock crashes. This re...
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作者：Liu, Nan; van de Ven, Peter M.; Zhang, Bo
作者单位：Boston College
摘要：Motivated by the increasing use of online appointment booking platforms, we study how to offer appointment slots to customers to maximize the total number of slots booked. We develop two models, nonsequential offering and sequential offering, to capture different types of interactions between customers and the scheduling system. In these two models, the scheduler offers either a single set of appointment slots for the arriving customer to choose from or multiple sets in sequence, respectively....
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作者：Mak, Vincent; Seale, Darryl A.; Rapoport, Amnon; Gisches, Eyran J.
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE); University of Nevada Las Vegas; University of Arizona
摘要：We propose a committee extension of the individual sequential search model called the secretary problem, where collective decisions on when to stop the search are reached via a prespecified voting rule. We offer a game-theoretic analysis of our model and then report two experiments on three-person committees with either uncorrelated or perfectly correlated preferences under three different voting rules followed by a third experiment on single decision makers. Relative to equilibrium prediction...
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作者：Sun, Yacheng; Zhang, Dan
作者单位：Tsinghua University; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：A little-understood phenomenon of customer reward programs is the prevalent use of finite reward expiration terms. We develop a theoretical framework to investigate the economic rationale behind this phenomenon and the trade-off between short and long expiration terms. In our model, a monopolistic firm sets the expiration term, along with the price and reward size, and interacts with consumers over an infinite horizon. Consumers are heterogeneous in shopping probabilities and product valuation...
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作者：Tan, Tom Fangyun; Netessine, Serguei
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We examine a large operational data set in a casual restaurant setting to study how coworkers' sales ability level affects other workers' sales performance. We find that waiters react nonlinearly to their coworkers' ability. In particular, when coworkers' overall sales ability is low, increasing this ability may prompt waiters to redouble both upselling and cross-selling efforts. When overall coworkers' ability is high, however, further increasing their ability may trigger waiters to reduce sa...
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作者：Kim, Keehyung; Chung, Kevin; Lim, Noah
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper seeks to understand the relational factors that may affect the decisions of both third-party raters and service providers in a setting where service providers compete with one another. We employ laboratory economics experiments to examine how removing anonymity and allowing for repeated interactions between the rater and the service provider impact both the ratings assigned by the rater and the quality levels expended by the service provider. Our methodology enables us to observe th...
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作者：Chan, Timothy C. Y.; Fearing, Douglas
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper Introduces the formal study of process flexibility to the novel domain of sports analytics. In baseball, positional flexibility Is the analogous concept to process flexibility from manufacturing. We study the flexibility of players (plants) on a baseball team who produce innings-played at different positions (products). We develop models and metrics to evaluate expected and worst-case performance under Injury risk (capacity uncertainty) with continuous player-position capabilities. ...
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作者：Rajan, Balaraman; Tezcan, Tolga; Seidmann, Abraham
作者单位：California State University System; California State University East Bay; University of London; London Business School; University of Rochester
摘要：Medical specialists treating chronic conditions typically face a heterogeneous set of patients. Such heterogeneity arises because of differences in medical conditions as well as the travel burden each patient faces to visit the clinic periodically. Given this heterogeneity, we compare the strategic behavior of revenue-maximizing and welfare-maximizing specialists and prove that the former will serve a smaller patient population, spend more time with the patients, and have shorter waiting times...
