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作者:Beaver, William H.; Cascino, Stefano; Correia, Maria; McNichols, Maureen F.
作者单位:Stanford University; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要:Using a large sample of business groups from more than 100 countries around the world, we show that group information matters for parent and subsidiary default prediction. Group firms may support each other when in financial distress. Potential group support represents an off-balance sheet asset for the receiving firm and an off-balance sheet liability for the firm offering support. We find that subsidiary information improves parent default prediction over and above group-level consolidated i...
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作者:Grewal, Jody; Riedl, Edward J.; Serafeim, George
作者单位:Harvard University; Boston University
摘要:We examine the equity market reaction to events associated with the passage of a directive in the European Union (EU) mandating increased nonfinancial disclosure. These disclosures relate to firms' environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance, and would be applicable to firms listed on EU exchanges or with significant operations in the EU. We predict and find (i) an average negative market reaction of -0.79% across all firms, (ii) a less negative market reaction for firms having hig...
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作者:Jagabathula, Srikanth; Rusmevichientong, Paat
作者单位:New York University; University of Southern California
摘要:Customer preferences may not be rational, so we focus on quantifying the limit of rationality (LoR) in choice modeling applications. We define LoR as the cost of approximating the observed choice fractions from a collection of offer sets with those from the best-fitting probability distribution over rankings. Computing LoR is intractable in the worst case. To deal with this challenge, we introduce two new concepts, rational separation and choice graph, through which we reduce the problem to so...
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作者:Cachon, Gerard P.; Gallino, Santiago; Olivares, Marcelo
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; Dartmouth College; Universidad de Chile
摘要:What is the relationship between inventory and sales? Clearly, inventory could increase sales: expanding inventory creates more choice (options, colors, etc.) and might signal a popular/desirable product. Or, inventory might encourage a consumer to continue her search (e.g., on the theory that she can return if nothing better is found), thereby decreasing sales (a scarcity effect). We seek to identify these effects in U.S. automobile sales. Our primary research challenge is the endogenous rela...
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作者:Miklos-Thal, Jeanine; Tucker, Catherine
作者单位:University of Rochester; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要:We build a game-theoretic model to examine how better demand forecasting resulting from algorithms, machine learning, and artificial intelligence affects the sustainability of collusion in an industry. We find that, although better forecasting allows colluding firms to better tailor prices to demand conditions, it also increases each firm's temptation to deviate to a lower price in time periods of high predicted demand. Overall, our research suggests that, despite concerns expressed by policy ...
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作者:Bastani, Hamsa; Goh, Joel; Bayati, Mohsen
作者单位:University of Pennsylvania; International Business Machines (IBM); IBM USA; National University of Singapore; Harvard University; Stanford University
摘要:Recent Medicare legislation seeks to improve patient care quality by financially penalizing providers for hospital-acquired infections (HAIs). However, Medicare cannot directly monitor HAI rates and instead relies on providers accurately self-reporting HAIs in claims to correctly assess penalties. Consequently, the incentives for providers to improve service quality may disappear if providers upcode, i.e., misreport HAIs (possibly unintentionally) in a manner that increases reimbursement or av...
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作者:Galizzi, Matteo M.; Navarro-Martinez, Daniel
作者单位:University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要:We present a lab-field experiment designed to systematically assess the external validity of social preferences elicited in a variety of experimental games. We do this by comparing behavior in the different games with several behaviors elicited in the field and with self-reported behaviors exhibited in the past, using the same sample of participants. Our results show that the experimental social preference games do a poor job explaining both social behaviors in the field and social behaviors f...
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作者:Nasser, Sherif; Turcic, Danko
作者单位:Cornell University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要:This paper analyzes a setting in which a manufacturer (he) and a retailer (she) face uncertain demand, but the retailer has an information advantage in the form of a private demand forecast. Such information asymmetry causes the manufacturer to incur a hidden information cost. The results show that a manufacturer can leverage his timing advantage to strategically implement a temporary contract adjustment (TCA) mechanism, which allows him to counter his informational disadvantage and either eli...
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作者:Morck, Randall; Yavuz, M. Deniz; Yeung, Bernard
作者单位:University of Alberta; National Bureau of Economic Research; Purdue University System; Purdue University; National University of Singapore
摘要:Within countries, individual state-run banks' lending correlates with prior money growth; similar private-sector banks' lending does not. Aggregate credit and investment growth correlate with prior money growth more where banking systems are more state-run. Size and liquidity differences between state-run and private-sector banks do not drive these results; further tests discount broad classes of alternative explanations. Tests exploiting heterogeneity in political pressure on state-run banks ...
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作者:Eisert, Tim; Eufinger, Christian
作者单位:Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
摘要:This paper explains why banks derive a benefit from being highly interconnected. We show that when banks are protected by government guarantees, they can significantly increase their expected returns by channeling funds through the interbank market before these funds are invested in real assets. If banks that are protected by implicit or explicit government guarantees act as intermediaries between other banks and real investments, there is the possibility that these intermediary banks will be ...