Minimal Frames and Transparent Frames for Risk, Time, and Uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Leland, Jonathan W.; Schneider, Mark; Wilcox, Nathaniel T.
• 署名单位: National Science Foundation (NSF); University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa; Chapman University System; Chapman University
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3167
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 4318-4335
• 关键词: salience; framing effects; Allais paradox; Ellsberg paradox; present bias

摘要

Behavior differs between transparent and nontransparent presentations of decisions, but transparent presentation has not been precisely defined. We formally define transparent frames for risk and time, establish their uniqueness, provide algorithms for constructing them, and compare them with standard presentation formats. A logic emerges for predicting systematic shifts in choice under risk and over time, and how violations of rational choice theory will depend on frames. An experiment verifies most of those predictions in choice under risk. We extend results to choice under uncertainty and also predict frame dependence of ambiguity aversion, a result supported by recent experimental evidence.