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作者：Hezarkhani, Behzad; Sosic, Greys
作者单位：Brunel University; University of Southern California
摘要：We study mechanisms to manage group purchasing among a set of buyers of a given product with a concave purchase cost function. The buyers are cost-sensitive and willing to buy a range of product quantities at different prices. We investigate two types of mechanisms that can be used by a group purchasing organization (GPO): (a) ordering mechanisms where the buyers, without divulging private information, choose their order quantities and pay for them according to a given cost-sharing rule or a f...
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作者：Coban, Elvin; Heching, Aliza; Scheller-Wolf, Alan
作者单位：Ozyegin University; International Business Machines (IBM); IBM USA; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We model a real-world service center with cross-trained agents serving customer requests that are heterogeneous with respect to complexity and priority levels: High priority requests preempt low priority requests and low-skilled agents can only serve less complex requests, while high skilled agents can serve all requests. Our main aim is to dynamically assign requests to agents considering the priority and complexity levels of requests. We model this system as a Markov chain that is infinite i...
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作者：Paul, Anand; Rajapakshe, Tharanga; Mallik, Suman
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida; State University System of Florida; University of Florida; University of Kansas
摘要：Motivated by the operational challenges faced by a Regional Blood Bank (RBB) in distributing the blood (and related products) among the hospitals in its service area, we study socially optimal contracting decisions of an RBB serving multiple hospitals. The supply of blood can be uncertain and insufficient to satisfy the total orders from hospitals. In the face of supply uncertainty, hospitals tend to over-order to compensate for a potential supply shortfall. When all hospitals inflate their or...
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作者：Lu, Tao; Chen, Ying-Ju; Tomlin, Brian; Wang, Yimin
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Dartmouth College; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：A vertical co-product technology simultaneously produces multiple outputs that differ along a rankable quality metric. Co-product manufacturers often sell products through a distributor. We examine a setting in which a manufacturer sells vertically differentiated co-products through a self-interested distributor to quality-sensitive end customers. The manufacturer determines its production, product line design, and wholesale prices. The distributor determines its purchase quantities and retail...
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作者：Jiang, Baojun; Liu, Chang
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Research has shown that many managers and entrepreneurs tend to be optimistic and are inclined to believe that negative shocks happen to them less frequently than to others. However, there is also evidence suggesting that such optimism is often inaccurate in reality and managerial optimism can lead to the failure of a company. We develop a game-theoretic model to investigate the impact of managerial optimism on firms' performance in a competitive market. Our analysis shows that a manager's opt...
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作者：Agrawal, Vishal; Lee, Deishin
作者单位：Georgetown University; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：To meet the growing demand for sustainably produced products, firms must be able to source sustainably produced parts from their suppliers. In this study, we analyze how a buyer (manufacturer or retailer) can use sourcing policies to influence their suppliers to adopt sustainable processes that can meet certain sustainability criteria. We study two sustainable sourcing policies commonly observed in practice, which influence suppliers' process decisions by committing to offer sustainable produc...
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作者：Devalkar, Sripad K.; Krishnan, Harish
作者单位：Indian School of Business (ISB); University of British Columbia
摘要：We consider how trade credit can coordinate a two-echelon supply chain in the presence of supplier moral hazard and costly working capital financing. While trade credit resolves moral hazard problems in the absence of working capital financing costs, we show that this is not necessarily true when financial frictions make financing trade credit costly. We then show that trade credit along with an appropriately designed reverse factoring program can restore supply chain efficiency.
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作者：Zhou, Yangfang (Helen); Scheller-Wolf, Alan; Secomandi, Nicola; Smith, Stephen
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Carnegie Mellon University; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We investigate the management of a merchant wind energy farm co-located with a grid-level storage facility and connected to a market through a transmission line. We formulate this problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) with stochastic wind speed and electricity prices. Consistent with most deregulated electricity markets, our model allows these prices to be negative. As this feature makes it difficult to characterize any optimal policy of our MDP, we show the optimality of a stage- and par...
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作者：Nault, Barrie R.; Rahman, Mohammad S.
作者单位：University of Calgary; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We examine the implications of proximity to a physical store in offline-online retail competition where online disutility costs, which encompasses factors such as trust in the seller, returns, and after-sales support, are important. Building on classical models, we consider a traditional retailer's expansion online, benefitting from the physical store's presence in serving customers online. Our innovation is to allow online disutility costs to be mitigated if the purchase is from a dual-channe...
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作者：Dasci, Abdullah; Guler, Kemal
作者单位：Sabanci University; Anadolu University
摘要：Many industries are characterized by large buyers and suppliers whose decisions are influenced by the strategic interactions among these parties. Here we present an economic model for a monopolistic buyer that needs to procure a critical item from two candidate suppliers competing to win the buyer's account. The buyer's objective is to design a procurement process that minimizes its total cost. We analyze this problem under one static and two dynamic procurement design choices and investigate ...
