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作者：Qian, Jun; Strahan, Philip E.
作者单位：Boston College; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Legal and institutional differences shape the ownership and terms of bank loans across the world. We show that under strong creditor protection, loans have more concentrated ownership, longer maturities, and lower interest rates. Moreover, the impact of creditor rights on loans depends on borrower characteristics such as the size and tangibility of assets. Foreign banks appear especially sensitive to the legal and institutional environment, with their ownership declining relative to domestic b...
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作者：Buraschi, Andrea; Jiltsov, Alexei
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Imperial College London; Imperial College London
摘要：This paper introduces a new class of nonaffine models of the term structure of interest rates that is supported by an economy with habit formation. Distinguishing features of the model are that the interest rate dynamics are nonlinear, interest rates depend on lagged monetary and consumption shocks, and the price of risk is not a constant multiple of interest rate volatility. We find that habit persistence can help reproduce the nonlinearity of the spot rate process, the documented deviations ...
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作者：Davydenko, Sergei A.; Strebulaev, Ilya A.
作者单位：University of Toronto; Stanford University
摘要：Do strategic actions of borrowers and lenders affect corporate debt values ? We find higher bond spreads for firms that can renegotiate debt contracts relatively easily. Consistent with theories of strategic debt service, the threat of strategic default depresses bond values ex ante, even though there may be efficiency gains from renegotiation ex post. However, the economic significance of the net effect is small, suggesting that bondholders have considerable bargaining power. The effect of st...
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作者：Christoffersen, Susan E. K.; Geczy, Christopher C.; Musto, David K.; Reed, Adam V.
作者单位：McGill University; University of Pennsylvania; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：The standard analysis of corporate governance assumes that shareholders vote in ratios that firms choose, such as one share-one vote. However, if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders choose the ratios. We document an active market for votes within the U.S. equity loan market, where the average vote sells for zero. We hypothesize that asymmetric information motivates the vote trade and find support in the cross section. More trading occurs for higher-s...
