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作者：BHAGAT, S; JEFFERIS, RH
作者单位：University of Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：The likelihood that a firm will enact a management-sponsored antitakeover charter amendment depends on ownership structure. This implies that the adoption of antitakeover amendments may be anticipated. Then announcement returns provide a biased estimate of wealth effects. An estimator that corrects for the bias induced by anticipation indicates that the enactment of an antitakeover amendment is associated with a statistically significant decrease in shareholder wealth. The voting power of empl...
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作者：BALDWIN, CY; BHATTACHARYYA, S
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper analyzes the sale of Conrail (Consolidated Rail Corporation) and finds three problems: first, a contingent claim gave the seller (the U.S. Government) conflicting objectives; second, bidders in the auction valued Conrail differently and thus did not compete effectively; and third, Conrail's management had an information advantage over the seller and outside bidders. These three factors can be present in any corporate divestiture and will tend to decrease the seller's revenue. We dis...
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作者：HAMPSON, P; PARSONS, J; BLITZER, C
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); The World Bank
摘要：To improve on the design of the production-sharing rule in a contract for exploration and development negotiated between a state-owned oil resources authority and a U.S. oil company, we use the Grossman and Hart (1983) principal-agent model. In the original contract, the company was granted a share of production as an incentive to maximize the net return to the authority. The optimal sharing rule we develop increases the expected return to the authority by 6% by improving the company's incenti...
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作者：SINGH, AK; COWAN, AR; NAYAR, N
作者单位：University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman
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作者：LODERER, CF; SHEEHAN, DP; KADLEC, GB
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Chicago
