A CASE-STUDY IN THE DESIGN OF AN OPTIMAL PRODUCTION SHARING RULE FOR A PETROLEUM-EXPLORATION VENTURE
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
HAMPSON, P; PARSONS, J; BLITZER, C
署名单位：
City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); The World Bank
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-405X
发表日期：
1991
页码：
45-67
关键词：
摘要：
To improve on the design of the production-sharing rule in a contract for exploration and development negotiated between a state-owned oil resources authority and a U.S. oil company, we use the Grossman and Hart (1983) principal-agent model. In the original contract, the company was granted a share of production as an incentive to maximize the net return to the authority. The optimal sharing rule we develop increases the expected return to the authority by 6% by improving the company's incentives to choose an optimal exploration program.