VOTING POWER IN THE PROXY PROCESS - THE CASE OF ANTITAKEOVER CHARTER AMENDMENTS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BHAGAT, S; JEFFERIS, RH
署名单位：
University of Chicago; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
0304-405X
DOI：
10.1016/0304-405X(91)90042-I
发表日期：
1991
页码：
193-225
关键词：
摘要：
The likelihood that a firm will enact a management-sponsored antitakeover charter amendment depends on ownership structure. This implies that the adoption of antitakeover amendments may be anticipated. Then announcement returns provide a biased estimate of wealth effects. An estimator that corrects for the bias induced by anticipation indicates that the enactment of an antitakeover amendment is associated with a statistically significant decrease in shareholder wealth. The voting power of employee stock ownership plans and the chief executive officer plays a prominent role in determining whether a firm will adopt this type of takeover defense.