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作者：Bharath, Sreedhar; Dahiya, Sandeep; Saunders, Anthony; Srinivasan, Anand
作者单位：New York University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Georgetown University; National University of Singapore
摘要：While many empirical studies document borrower benefits of lending relationships, less is known about lender benefits. A relationship tender's informational advantage over a non-relationship lender may generate a higher probability of selling information-sensitive products to its borrowers. Our results show that the probability of a relationship lender providing a future loan is 42%, while for a non-relationship lender, this probability is 3%. Consistent with theory, we find that borrowers wit...
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作者：Laeven, Luc; Levine, Ross
作者单位：The World Bank; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Brown University
摘要：This paper investigates whether the diversity of activities conducted by financial institutions influences their market valuations. We find that there is a diversification discount: The market values of financial conglomerates that engage in multiple activities, e.g., lending and non-lending financial services, are lower than if those financial conglomerates were broken into financial intermediaries that specialize in the individual activities. While difficult to identify a single causal facto...
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作者：Brown, Gregory; Kapadia, Nishad
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We show that the increase in firm-specific risk in the US stock market is the result of new listings by riskier companies. In addition, our results explain why prior researchers have found that growth opportunities, profit margin, firm size, and industry composition (among other factors) are related to increases in firm-specific risk. The new listing effect is not driven by small companies becoming riskier but instead by a riskier sub-sample of the economy becoming publicly traded. These resul...
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作者：Chen, Xia; Harford, Jarrad; Li, Kai
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of British Columbia
摘要：Within a cost benefit framework, we hypothesize that independent institutions with long-term investments will specialize in monitoring and influencing efforts rather than trading. Other institutions will not monitor. Using acquisition decisions to reveal monitoring, we show that only concentrated holdings by independent long-term institutions are related to post-merger performance. Further, the presence of these institutions makes withdrawal of bad bids more likely. These institutions make lon...
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作者：Baker, Malcolm; Coval, Joshua; Stein, Jeremy C.
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：We argue that inertial behavior on the part of investors can have significant consequences for corporate financial policy. One implication of investor inertia is that it improves the terms for the acquiring firm in a stock-for-stock merger, because acquirer shares are placed in the hands of investors, who, independent of their beliefs, do not resell these shares on the open market. In the presence of a downward-sloping demand curve, this leads to a reduction in price pressure and, hence, to ch...
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作者：Malmendier, Ulrike; Shanthikumar, Devin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Harvard University
摘要：Security analysts tend to bias stock recommendations upward, particularly if they are affiliated with the underwriter. We analyze how investors account for such distortions. Using the NYSE Trades and Quotations database, we find that large traders adjust their trading response downward. While they exert buy pressure following strong buy recommendations, they display no reaction to buy recommendations and selling pressure following hold recommendations. This discounting is even more pronounced ...
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作者：Mehran, Hamid; Stulz, Rene M.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York
摘要：A conflict of interest exists when a party to a transaction can gain by taking actions that are detrimental to its counterparty. This paper examines the growing empirical literature on the economics of conflicts of interest in financial institutions. Economic analysis shows that, although conflicts of interest are omnipresent when contracting is costly and parties are imperfectly informed, there are important factors that mitigate their impact and, strikingly, it is possible for customers of f...
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作者：Andricopoulos, Ari D.; Widdicks, Martin; Newton, David P.; Duck, Peter W.
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of Manchester; University of Manchester
摘要：The exposition of the quadrature (QUAD) method (Andricopoulos, Widdicks, Duck, and Newton, 2003. Universal option valuation using quadrature methods. Journal of Financial Economics 67, 447-471 (see also Corrigendum, Journal of Financial Economics 73, 603 (2004)) is significantly extended to cover notably more complex and difficult problems in option valuations involving one or more underlyings. Trials comparing several techniques in the literature, adapted from standard lattice, grid and Monte...
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作者：Faleye, Olubunmi
作者单位：Northeastern University
摘要：This paper shows that classified boards destroy value by entrenching management and reducing director effectiveness. First, I show that classified boards are associated with a significant reduction in firm value and that this holds even among complex firms, although such firms are often regarded as most likely to benefit from staggered board elections. I then examine how classified boards entrench management by focusing on CEO turnover, executive compensation, proxy contests, and shareholder p...
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作者：Love, Inessa; Preve, Lorenzo A.; Sarria-Allende, Virginia
作者单位：Austral University; The World Bank
摘要：This paper studies the effect of financial crises on trade credit for a sample of 890 firms in six emerging economies. Although the provision of trade credit increases right after a crisis, it contracts in the following months and years. Firms that are financially more vulnerable to crises extend less trade credit to their customers. We argue that the decline in aggregate trade credit ratios is driven by the reduction in the supply of trade credit that follows a bank credit crunch, consistent ...
