Is there a diversification discount in financial conglomerates?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Laeven, Luc; Levine, Ross
• 署名单位: The World Bank; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Brown University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.06.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 331-367
• 关键词: corporate diversification; banking; economies of scope; AGENCY COSTS

摘要

This paper investigates whether the diversity of activities conducted by financial institutions influences their market valuations. We find that there is a diversification discount: The market values of financial conglomerates that engage in multiple activities, e.g., lending and non-lending financial services, are lower than if those financial conglomerates were broken into financial intermediaries that specialize in the individual activities. While difficult to identify a single causal factor, the results are consistent with theories that stress intensified agency problems in financial conglomerates engaged in multiple activities and indicate that economics of scope are not sufficiently large to produce a diversification premium. (C) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.