So what do I get? The bank's view of lending relationships

• 成果类型: Article; Proceedings Paper
• 署名作者: Bharath, Sreedhar; Dahiya, Sandeep; Saunders, Anthony; Srinivasan, Anand
• 署名单位: New York University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Georgetown University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.08.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 368-419
• 关键词: LENDING RELATIONSHIPS; bank loans; information asymmetry; debt/equity underwriting

摘要

While many empirical studies document borrower benefits of lending relationships, less is known about lender benefits. A relationship tender's informational advantage over a non-relationship lender may generate a higher probability of selling information-sensitive products to its borrowers. Our results show that the probability of a relationship lender providing a future loan is 42%, while for a non-relationship lender, this probability is 3%. Consistent with theory, we find that borrowers with greater information asymmetries are significantly likely to obtain future loans from their relationship lenders. Relationship lenders are likely to be chosen to provide debt/equity underwriting services, but this effect is economically small. (C) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.