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作者：Lins, Karl V.; Servaes, Henri; Tufano, Peter
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; European Corporate Governance Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We survey chief financial officers from 29 countries to examine whether and why firms use lines of credit versus non-operational (excess) cash for their corporate liquidity. We find that these two liquidity sources are employed to hedge against different risks. Nonoperational cash guards against future cash flow shocks in bad times, while credit lines give firms the option to exploit future business opportunities available in good times. Lines of credit are the dominant source of liquidity for...
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作者：Atanasov, Vladimir; Black, Bernard; Ciccotello, Conrad; Gyoshev, Stanley
作者单位：William & Mary; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Exeter
摘要：We model and test the mechanisms through which law affects tunneling and tunneling affects firm valuation. In 2002, Bulgaria adopted legal changes which limit equity tunneling through dilutive equity offerings and freezeouts. Following the changes, minority shareholders participate equally in equity offerings, where before they Suffered severe dilution; freezeout offer price ratios quadruple; and Tobin's q rises sharply for firms at high risk of tunneling. The paper shows the importance of leg...
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作者：Bakshi, Gurdip; Panayotov, George
作者单位：Georgetown University; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：This paper proposes a risk measure, based on first-passage probability, which reflects intra-horizon risk in jump models with finite or infinite jump activity. Our empirical investigation shows, first, that the proposed risk measure consistently exceeds the benchmark value-at-risk (VaR). Second, jump risk tends to amplify intra-horizon risk. Third, we find large variation in our risk measure across jump models, indicative of model risk. Fourth, among the jump models we consider, the finite-mom...
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作者：Aktas, Nihat; de Bodt, Eric; Roll, Richard
作者单位：Universite de Lille; emlyon business school
摘要：Many takeovers occur after one-on-one negotiations, which suggests a troubling lack of competition. We seek to determine whether acquirers in such friendly deals are truly insulated from competitive pressures. We study two countervailing influences: (1) potential but unobserved latent competition, i.e., the likelihood that rival bidders could appear, and (2) anticipated auction costs when negotiations fail. Using various proxies, we find that latent competition increases the bid premium offere...
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作者：Duchin, Ran; Ozbas, Oguzhan; Sensoy, Berk A.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Southern California
摘要：We study the effect of the recent financial crisis on corporate investment. The crisis represents an unexplored negative shock to the supply of external finance for non-financial firms. Corporate investment declines significantly following the onset of the crisis, controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying measures of investment opportunities. Consistent with a causal effect of a supply shock, the decline is greatest for firms that have low cash reserves or high net short-term debt, a...
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作者：Li, Haitao; Xu, Yuewu; Zhang, Xiaoyan
作者单位：Fordham University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Cornell University
摘要：We develop a specification test and a sequence of model selection procedures for non-nested, overlapping, and nested models based on the second Hansen-Jagannathan distance, which requires a good asset pricing model to not only have small pricing errors but also be arbitrage free. Our methods have reasonably good finite sample performances and are more powerful than existing ones in detecting misspecified models with small pricing errors but are not arbitrage-free and in differentiating models ...
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作者：Stuart, Toby E.; Yim, Soojin
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We examine how board networks affect change-of-control transactions by investigating whether directors' deal exposure acquired through board service at different companies affect their current firms' likelihood of being targeted in a private equity-backed, take-private transaction. In our sample of all US publicly traded firms in 2000-2007, we find that companies which have directors with private equity deal exposure gained from interlocking directorships are approximately 42% more likely to r...
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作者：Demiroglu, Cem; James, Christopher M.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida; Koc University
摘要：This paper investigates whether the reputation of acquiring private equity groups (PEGs) is related to the financing structure of leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Using a sample of 180 public-to-private LBOs in the US between January 1, 1997 and August 15, 2007, we find that reputable PEGs are more active in the LBO market when credit risk spreads are low and lending standards in the credit markets are lax. We also find that reputable PEGs pay narrower bank and institutional loan spreads, have longer...
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作者：Boehmer, Ekkehart; Huszar, Zsuzsa R.; Jordan, Bradford D.
作者单位：University of Kentucky; University of Oregon; Universite Catholique de Lille; EDHEC Business School; National University of Singapore; California State University System; California State Polytechnic University Pomona
摘要：Stocks with relatively high short interest subsequently experience negative abnormal returns, but the effect can be transient and of debatable economic significance. In contrast, relatively heavily traded stocks with low short interest experience both statistically and economically significant positive abnormal returns. These positive returns are often larger (in absolute value) than the negative returns observed for heavily shorted stocks. Thus, the positive information associated with low sh...
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作者：Acharya, Viral V.; Johnson, Timothy C.
作者单位：New York University; University of London; London Business School; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Prior theoretical research has found that, in the absence of regulation, a greater number of insiders leads to more insider trading. We show that optimal regulation features detection and punishment policies that become stricter as the number of insiders increases, reducing insider trading in equilibrium. We construct measures of the likelihood of insider activity prior to bid announcements of private-equity buyouts during the period 2000-2006 and relate these to the number of financing partic...
