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作者：Giroud, Xavier; Mueller, Holger M.
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; European Corporate Governance Institute
摘要：By reducing the threat of a hostile takeover, business combination (BC) laws weaken corporate governance and increase the opportunity for managerial slack. Consistent with the notion that competition mitigates managerial slack, we find that while firms in non-competitive industries experience a significant drop in operating performance after the laws' passage, firms in competitive industries experience no significant effect. When we examine which agency problem competition mitigates, we find e...
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作者：Aggarwal, Rajesh K.; Jorion, Philippe
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：This paper provides the first systematic analysis of performance patterns for emerging funds and managers in the hedge fund industry. Emerging funds and managers have particularly strong financial incentives to create investment performance and, because of their size, may be more nimble than established ones. Performance measurement, however, needs to control for the usual biases afflicting hedge fund databases. After adjusting for such biases and using a novel event time approach, we find str...
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作者：DeAngelo, Harry; DeAngelo, Linda; Stulz, Rene M.
作者单位：University of Southern California; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：Both a firm's market-timing opportunities and its corporate lifecycle stage exert statistically and economically significant influences on the probability that it conducts a seasoned equity offering (SEO), with the lifecycle effect empirically stronger. Neither effect adequately explains SEO decisions because a near-majority of issuers are not growth firms and the vast majority of firms with high M/B ratios and high recent and poor future stock returns fail to issue stock. Since without the of...
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作者：Panageas, Stavros
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：A firm's termination leads to bankruptcy costs. This may create an incentive for outside stakeholders or the firm's debtholders to bail out the firm as bankruptcy looms. Because of this implicit guarantee, firm shareholders have an incentive to increase volatility in order to exploit the implicit protection. However, if they increase volatility too much they may induce the guarantee-extending parties to walk away. I derive the optimal risk management rule in such a framework and show that it a...
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作者：Campello, Murillo; Graham, John R.; Harvey, Campbell R.
作者单位：Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：We survey 1,050 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in the U.S., Europe, and Asia to directly assess whether their firms are credit constrained during the global financial crisis of 2008. We study whether corporate spending plans differ conditional on this survey-based measure of financial constraint. Our evidence indicates that constrained firms planned deeper cuts in tech spending, employment, and capital spending. Constrained firms also burned through more cash, drew more heavily on lines of cr...
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作者：Leary, Mark T.; Roberts, Michael R.
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We quantify the empirical relevance of the pecking order hypothesis using a novel empirical model and testing strategy that addresses statistical power concerns with previous tests. While the classificatory ability of the pecking order varies significantly depending on whether one interprets the hypothesis in a strict or liberal (e.g., modified pecking order) manner, the pecking order is never able to accurately classify more than half of the observed financing decisions. However, when we expa...
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作者：Fernandes, Nuno; Lel, Ugur; Miller, Darius P.
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; International Institute for Management Development (IMD); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：We examine the first significant deregulation of U.S. disclosure requirements since the passage of the 1933/1934 Exchange and Securities Acts: the 2007 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 12h-6. Rule 12h-6 has made it easier for foreign firms to deregister with the SEC and thereby terminate their U.S. disclosure obligations. We show that the market reacted negatively to the announcement by the SEC that firms from countries with weak disclosure and governance regimes could more easily...
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作者：Chen, Shuping; Chen, Xia; Cheng, Qiang; Shevlin, Terry
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：Taxes represent a significant cost to the firm and shareholders, and it is generally expected that shareholders prefer tax aggressiveness. However, this argument ignores potential non-tax costs that can accompany tax aggressiveness, especially those arising from agency problems. Firms owned/run by founding family members are characterized by a unique agency conflict between dominant and small shareholders. Using multiple measures to capture tax aggressiveness and founding family presence, we f...
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作者：Barnea, Amir; Cronqvist, Henrik; Siegel, Stephan
作者单位：University of Washington
摘要：Using data on identical and fraternal twins' complete financial portfolios, we decompose the cross-sectional variation in investor behavior. We find that a genetic factor explains about one-third of the variance in stock market participation and asset allocation. Family environment has an effect on the behavior of young individuals, but this effect is not long-lasting and disappears as an individual gains experience. Frequent contact among twins results in similar investment behavior beyond a ...
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作者：Gao, Xiaohui; Ritter, Jay R.
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
摘要：In an accelerated seasoned equity offering (SEO), an issuer foregoes the investment bank's marketing efforts in return for a lower fee. To explain why many issuing firms choose a higher cost fully marketed offer, we posit that the marketing effort flattens the issuer's short-run demand curve. Alternatively stated, with a fully marketed offer, the issuer is paying investment bankers to create demand, making the elasticity of demand at the time of issuance an endogenous choice variable. Empirica...
