Negotiations under the threat of an auction

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aktas, Nihat; de Bodt, Eric; Roll, Richard
• 署名单位: Universite de Lille; emlyon business school
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.06.002
• 发表日期: 2010
• 页码: 241-255
• 关键词: Merger negotiations; Latent competition; Auction costs; Bid premium

摘要

Many takeovers occur after one-on-one negotiations, which suggests a troubling lack of competition. We seek to determine whether acquirers in such friendly deals are truly insulated from competitive pressures. We study two countervailing influences: (1) potential but unobserved latent competition, i.e., the likelihood that rival bidders could appear, and (2) anticipated auction costs when negotiations fail. Using various proxies, we find that latent competition increases the bid premium offered in negotiated deals and that auction costs reduce the premium. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.