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作者：Gompers, Paul A.; Gornall, Will; Kaplan, Steven N.; Strebulaev, Ilya A.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of British Columbia; University of Chicago; Stanford University
摘要：We survey 885 institutional venture capitalists (VCs) at 681 firms to learn how they make decisions. Using the framework in Kaplan and Stromberg (2001), we provide detailed information on VCs' practices in pre-investment screening (sourcing evaluating and selecting investments), in structuring investments, and in post-investment monitoring and advising. In selecting investments, VCs see the management team as somewhat more important than business-related characteristics such as product or tech...
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作者：Brown, Jennifer; Matsa, David A.
作者单位：University of British Columbia; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper examines how housing market distress affects job search. Using data from a leading online job search platform during the Great Recession, we find that job seekers in areas with depressed housing markets apply for fewer jobs that require relocation. With their search constrained geographically, job seekers broaden their search for lower-level positions nearby. These effects are stronger for job seekers with recourse mortgages, which we confirm using a spatial regression discontinuity...
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作者：Albuquerque, Rui; Song, Shiyun; Yao, Chen
作者单位：Boston College; European Corporate Governance Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; The Vanguard Group, Inc.; Chinese University of Hong Kong
摘要：Do stock prices of publicly listed companies respond to changes in transaction costs? Using the SEC's pilot program that increased the tick size for approximately 1,200 randomly chosen stocks, we find a stock price decrease between 1.75% and 3.2% for small spread stocks affected by the larger tick size relative to a control group. We find that the increase in the present value of transaction costs accounts for a small percentage of the price decrease. We study channels of price variation due t...
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作者：Chava, Sudheer; Danis, Andras; Hsu, Alex
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：We analyze the economic and financial impact of right-to-work (RTW) laws in the US. Using data from collective bargaining agreements, we show that there is a decrease in wages for unionized workers after RTW laws. Firms increase investment and employment but reduce financial leverage. Labor-intensive firms experience higher profits and labor-to-asset ratios. Dividends and executive compensation also increase post-RTW. Our results are consistent with a canonical theory of the firm augmented wit...
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作者：Evans, Richard Burtis; Prado, Melissa Porras; Zambrana, Rafael
作者单位：University of Virginia; Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：Using manager compensation disclosure and intra-family manager cooperation measures, we create indices of family-level competitive/cooperative incentives. Families that encourage cooperation among their managers are more likely to engage in coordinated behavior (e.g., cross-trading and cross-holding) and have less volatile cash flows. Families with competitive incentives generate higher performing funds, a higher fraction of star funds, but greater performance dispersion across funds. In exami...
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作者：Cujean, Julien
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Bern
摘要：I develop an equilibrium model to explain why few mutual fund managers consistently outperform, even though many have strong informational advantages. The key ingredient is that managers obtain investment ideas through idea sharing. Idea sharing improves statistical significance of alpha through increased price informativeness. But it also causes better informed managers to take larger positions, which makes their alpha noisier although a significant fraction of managers builds strong informat...
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作者：Gonzalez-Uribe, Juanita
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：I explore the prevalence of exchanges of innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios. I show that after companies join investors' portfolios, several proxies of exchanges between them and portfolio companies (relative to matched nonportfolio companies) increase by an average of 60%. The increase holds when joining events are plausibly exogenous and when VCs' bargaining power and potential conflicts of interest are low. Three novel mechanisms are supported: carve-outs, spawning, and ...
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作者：Chen, Yong; Kelly, Bryan; Wu, Wei
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Mays Business School; Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study how sophisticated investors, when faced with shocks to information environ-ment, change their information acquisition and trading behavior, and how these changes in turn affect market efficiency. We find that, after exogenous reductions of analyst coverage due to closures and mergers of brokerage firms, hedge funds scale up information acquisition, trade more aggressively, and earn higher abnormal returns on the affected stocks. The hedge fund participation also mitigates the impairme...
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作者：Kowaleski, Zachary T.; Sutherland, Andrew G.; Vetter, Felix W.
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study the consequences of a 2010 change in the investment adviser qualification exam that reallocated coverage from the rules and ethics section to the technical material section. Comparing advisers with the same employer in the same location and year, we find those passing the exam with more rules and ethics coverage are one-fourth less likely to commit misconduct. The exam change appears to affect advisers' perception of acceptable conduct and not just their awareness of specific rules or...
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作者：Donaldson, Jason Roderick; Gromb, Denis; Piacentino, Giorgia
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Columbia University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a model in which collateral serves to protect creditors from the claims of other creditors. We find that, paradoxically, borrowers rely most on collateral when pledgeability is high. This is when taking on new debt is easy, which dilutes existing creditors. Creditors thus require collateral for protection against possible dilution by collateralized debt. There is a collateral rat race. But collateralized borrowing has a cost: it encumbers assets, constraining future borrowing and in...
