The economic impact of right-to-work laws: Evidence from collective bargaining agreements and corporate policies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chava, Sudheer; Danis, Andras; Hsu, Alex
• 署名单位: University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0304-405X
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.02.005
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 451-469
• 关键词: Right to work; Collective bargaining; unions; wage growth; INVESTMENT

摘要

We analyze the economic and financial impact of right-to-work (RTW) laws in the US. Using data from collective bargaining agreements, we show that there is a decrease in wages for unionized workers after RTW laws. Firms increase investment and employment but reduce financial leverage. Labor-intensive firms experience higher profits and labor-to-asset ratios. Dividends and executive compensation also increase post-RTW. Our results are consistent with a canonical theory of the firm augmented with an exogenous bargaining power of labor and suggest that RTW laws impact corporate policies by decreasing that bargaining power. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.